Printed papers on the political situation and military policy in Egypt [‎21r] (41/176)

CIRCULATED TO THE CABINET,
1 This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Government.
No. 1.—SECRETARY OF STATE.
fafN
EGYPT AND SOUDAN.
CONFIDENTIAL
/A
September 24.
v
Section 1.
V
[E 9506/10/16] No. 1. V \
Mr. Scott to the Marquess Curzon of Kedleston — (Received September 24.)
(No. 63b. Confidential.)
My Lord, Ramleh, September 14, 1923.
IT seems opportune to record briefly the state of the political forces in Egypt on
the eve of Zaghlul Pasha’s return. In doing so one may reflect, I think, with
satisfaction upon the extent to which, during the past summer, tin process of
disengaging ourselves from the interplay of these forces has been continued.
2. The intense preoccupation with political matters which prevailed in Egypt
from the time of the armistice, and which did not begin to slacken until last year, has
very noticeably diminished in recent months. This is chiefly attributable to the
definition of their policy by His Majesty’s Government, to the natural weariness
resulting from a prolonged strain, and to the economic conditions which have reduced
the supply of cash available for financing political agitation. I may mention that the
circulation of newspapers which live by anti-governmental or party invective has of
late strikingly decreased. This comparative apathy will, doubtless, be interrupted for
a period by Zaghlul Pasha’s arrival and by the elections
3. King Fuad has, I think, appreciably fortified his position, partly by holding
close contact with elements of the Wald, partly by introducing his supporters into
several high administrative posts, 'these methods of fortification are, perhaps, not
very solid : the durability of the one depends upon His Majesty’s attitude to Zaghlul
himself; and the other, though it strengthens his actual hold over the Ministry and
the Administration, has served to increase his unpopularity (and the Ministry’s) in the
country at large. It is to be remembered, how r ever, that he is now r a rich man, and
that he loses no occasion of extending his influence in religious circles. He is
threatened in particular bv two dangers, his weakness against which lies chiefly in his
unpopularitv — Zaghlul on the* one hand, and on the other the intrigues of his own
relations. 1 allude, of course, especially to the ex-Khedive, but the activities of
Prince Omar Toussoun and Prince Mohammed Ali are by no means indifferent to him.
I think His Majesty is reasonably alive to the danger from Zaghlul. He is without
doubt passionately alive to the danger from his own relations, and this fact is very
relevant to his attitude towards the Zaghlulists.
4. The fact that the Ministry has acted, in accordance with the Prime Minister’s
avowed intentions, in harmony both with the King and with ourselves, has given
strength to a Cabinet which is not, on the whole, composed of men of outstanding
influence or ability. It is thus that the Ministry has been able to work with a rapidity
which has taken the wind out of its opponents’ sails, and to maintain a neutrality in
regard to party politics, which, coupled with the Prime Minister’s personal reputation
for integrity, has won it a solid measure of support in the country. But the Ministry
has consequently exposed itself to a very general criticism that it is the instrument of
the Palace or else of the Residency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, established in the provinces and regions considered part of, or under the influence of, British India. ; and some of the appointments which it has made
tend, in the public mind, to justify the former charge. Provisions of the Penal Code
concerned with public order and offences against the internal security of the State have
recently been made more stringent, and this, while in the long run strengthening the
Government, is likely to be used bv the Ministry’s opponents in arousing hostility to it.
The Ministry is continually the subject of bitter political attacks in the Zaghlulist
press; the Adhst opposition is less violent, and is based largely upon administrative
differences, and also, perhaps, upon pique.
5. The Adlist party, to all appearance, is not in great feather, Sarwat Pasha’s
resignation, though at the time it seemed almost a relief to them, w ? as a disaster, and
they lost an opportunity when Adly Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. failed to take office six months ago.
Overtly they are not working with anything like the spirit and activity of the
Zaghlulists, but they rather rely, it is true, on a different and less spectacular sort of
influence. They presume that the men who will be elected to Parliament through
their local influence as landowners are by disposition hostile to Zaghlul ; they even
[399 aa—Ij