File 4722/1918 Pt 8 'Mesopotamia: Situation' [‎149v] (309/995)

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Levies Diwaniyah, considered bis men not trained enougb to move to Samawah
and Hillab conld not supply Levies.
G.O.C., 34th Brigade, Hillali, was asked to aquiese in a. scheme for a small
body of troops to deal with the Shanabrak village. The matter was first put
up to him on 22nd June, but owing to various delays the action was not settled
to come off till 4th July. In the meantime disorders were spreading. On June
4 th, A.P.O., Bumaithah, had wired “ Signs unrest here. Abdul Abbas volun
teers information that treason is rife in bazaar. Firing taken place last two
nights ”. A.P.O., Samawah, was also pressing* for action against Shanabrah
who were unsettling* other tribes. On 17th, Bumaithah, reported that the
Dhawalim Shaikhs had sworn not to pay Bevenue. On 22nd, Samawah re
ported rumours of impending* attack on the Town.
A.P.O., Bumaithah, visited me a few days before the castigation.of A1
Bhanabrah should have taken place. He was not very conversant with affairs
in other parts of the country and imagined the troubles to be purely local, and
experienced difficulty in getting information about his tribes. He said that
the Dhawalim still owed Bevenue from last year and that he had sent for the
Shaikh and asked how he was to deal with him.
I had that morning received reliable information that this tribe were
definitely “ out ” and had their flags out and had declared themselves
“ Gom ” or at war with Government. I still hoped that punishment
of A1 Shanabrah might improve the situation though we had to wait some
•days to do so. On the other hand if the Shaikh were decidedly
out of hand which would mean that he considered he had already
committed himself and would not be likely to stop, he would have
no alternative but to arrest him and send him at once to Diwaniyah which
should keep the tribe quiet till the Shanabrah had been dealt with. The
•Shaikh was in fact very truculent at the interview and A.P.O., put him under
arrest. It was unfortunate that he did so at noon, there being no train to
Diwaniyah till evening, but it is doubtful whether in any case it would have
succeeded. Later in the day armed tribesmen rushed and killed the Police
guard and released the Shaikh. A.P.O., Samawah, afterwards learnt that
the Shaikh had anticipated the arrest and had pre-arranged his release by force.
It was in all probability a situation similar to the Bishadi canal affair, namely
it had been decided to force our hands at any cost. At the same time as these
events were occurring I received several reports that the Division was being
literally flooded with messengers from Shamiyah stirring up the tribes. This
was confirmed by A.P.O., Bumaithah and (Samawah, and later by P.O.,
Shamiyah, who stated that he was taking action which he asked me to report
the effects of in seven days time. It was however unfortunately a matter of
hours not days and there was little hope as far as Bumaithah was concerned of
any eleventh hour action elsewhere having effect in time to be of use. Beports
received direct at Diwaniyah from Mamur Shinafiyah stated that the brother
of Saiyid Muhsin Tahikh was touring the tribes there urging them on to join
the Bumaithah rebels and was supplying them with cash. Beports from
Shanifiyah had previously indicated that the Bumaithah tribes had for some
months been buying rifles there.
At this sage the action against A1 Shanabrah was cancelled and the
following day the Dhawalim joined by A1 Shanabrah and some others attacked
Bailway posts and destroyed the line. Just before this 100 men from Hillah
under Major Hay had got through to Samawah and succeeded in sending 50 to
Bumaithah, though I did not hear of this for some days. Small numbers had
also proceeded from Diwaniyah until a train was derailed. On 3rd July, I
received a letter, dated the 2nd, 48 hours after Hay had been entirely cut off
from us, from the Hillah Brigade, in which I was directed “ not to'hesitate
to inform Hay direct and request him direct for troops in case of emergency ”.
As the most urgent situation had clearly arisen and was not apparently clear
in Hillah, I wired en clair giving a summary of the situation which had already
been communicated immediately as events had happened. I consider that
much unnecessary delay had been caused by my being* required by the Military
authorities to give details of the plan of attack I advocated. The terrain was
difficult and I replied that I considered the main point was to get a force on
the spot to stop disorder spreading and that the Officer in Command on the
^pot could alone determine the tactical details. I was reminded not to suggest
schemes of an extensive nature owing to the fact “ that the hot weather limited
Infantry action ”. I was also informed that it would be difficult but we
might get one Infantry Battalion. Under the circumstances, with the situa
tion changing with every hour of delay no scheme made out in advance would
be likely to meet the situation when put into action.*
From now on small bodies of troops began to arrive at Diwaniyah, where
however there was no one definitely in command. Officers in command of de
tachments said they had had orders at Hillah, that they were to go to
Bumaithah. One detachment understood they were for Samawah and had no
knowledge that the line was up. As there appeared to be no unity nor Defence
scheme I asked Officers to assemble at my house and evoked a temporary de
fence scheme which held good until the arrival of General Conningham when
matters again became normal.
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