File 4722/1918 Pt 8 'Mesopotamia: Situation' [‎149r] (308/995)

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fallalis seeing' A1 i'atlali depart started to drift off. It was obvious that with
out issuing stringent orders 1 could not control situation, on the other hand
such orders might not have been obeyed and would have produced a serious
situation. I was privately warned by a Shaikh that my hand was being
forced and that I would be advised not to fall into the trap. Accordingly I
announced to the tribes that as the harvest was approaching I would not keep
them longer at the work and that they might return to the fields. This move
on my part was unexpected and Haji Mukhif’s family urged me to tell the
tribes that they must finish, on the grounds that the men would work better in
order to get back early to harvest. This I declined to do and said that any
tribe who wished might stay of their own accord rather than come back after
the harvest. The tribes dispersed quietly. But for intrigue the work would
have been completed before the harvest.
From now onwards I received constant reports of intriguing at Najaf and
that Haji Mukhif was there and well involved. The C.I.D. also reported his
presence at a meeting where be offered assistance. I sent for him to return to
his lands prefering to have him where his activities could be limited.
JMo reports were received from Rumaithah re the activities of Muhsin Tabikh
with the Dhawalim, but I heard from other sources and directed the A.P.O.
to watch matters closely. The difficulty in Rumaithah was that there existed
no influential person whom we could use to counteract him. Abdul Abbas of
Bani Zuraij who might have served is a mortal enemy of Muhsin and is a faint
hearted person to boot.
Meanwhile crop assessments took place and the greatest satisfaction was
evinced on all sides at the new fixed rate generally accepted as very light.
The only trouble experienced was in an outlying section of Albu Jayyash who
border on A1 Sufran. The latter being “ out ” I had ordered the A.P.O. not
to attempt to measure their lands. The neighbouring section of Albu Jayyash
considered the privilege should be extended and held up and threatened the
A.P.O. who extricated himself from a difficult position with skill.
Haji Mukhif nothing daunted, started a fresh series of intrigues in Afaq
and Dagharah which, there being peace elsewhere, we were unable to frustrate.
It was then reported to me that the Fatlah Shaikhs who had hoped to foment
trouble, on the Dagharah had given up all hope and had reported H. Mukhif
to Mirza Muhammad Taqi for not helping sufficiently. Certain it is that he
was sent for from Karbala, but he was not permitted to leave Diwaniyah.
In Rumaithah Muhsin Tabikh had an easier task. The Bani Hachaim
have a record for lawlessness second to none, and the Dhawalim have long
been their leaders in this respect. They were told that Government had under
taken to the League of Nations to use no military force in ‘Iraq and. had in
fact removed their troops. Much was also made of their inaccessibility and
consequent immunity from punishment.
About the time of the Tel Afar outrage, affairs in Shamiyah appeared to be
getting worse. The P.0, was said to have been openly insulted and I was
asked wdiat we were doing in the matter.
The arrests in Hillah and Karbala had for the moment a salutary effect,
but I was frequently asked “ Why does Government allow the Shamiyah
Shaikhs to almost openly advocate rebellion? You have arrested the son of
the Mirza so cannot be afraid to deal with a Shaikh. Had not we known the
Mirza’s son to be “ Fasid ” there would have been a rebellion at once. Have
the tribes never committed any offences since you came to ‘Iraq? You have
never hanged a responsible Shaikh—the Turks would have hanged half a dozen
by this time and there would have been no more of it. The tribes are rich
beyond their wildest dreams and convinced that Government will never hurt a
big Shaikh.” . .
\fter this conversation, I wired advocating the arrest of at least one tribal
shaikh involved. I understand that this was not considered feasible m
Shamivah at the time. Local opinion in Diwaniyah was that Shamiyah would
never actually have broken out if arrests had been made. They are too rich in
immoveable property, gardens, etc., to be willing to commit themselves until
they had first got other parts of the country involved against Government.
The remaining Shaikhs would have gloated oyer the arrests and have rushed to
put the blame on the prisoners and to clear themselves. Ihis is the view of
several shaikhs in Diwaniyah, not that of townspeople though some of the
latter agreed. , , n ,
The fact that the disturbance in Baghdad was not followed by the arrest
of the ringleaders was much commented on. The arrests made were regarded
as unimportant. The Rais al Baladiyah when he heard of the disturbance
remarked “That is a good thing, now Government will arrest that dog
Suwaidi who would spill half the blood of ‘Iraq to get himself a good job.
You are used to the Politics of Governments. That is no good for Iraq.
Remember “ Aql al Arab fi ‘Ainihi ” you must show the people that you do
not tolerate treason ”. , , . .
A.bout this time a complication occurred at Samawah, where a brancli of
the Nationalist party, was working quietly The prisoners, with the conniv
ance of some of the police, escaped to Al Shanabrah section of Albu Jayyash
who refused to give them up or to return rifles of the police. The Lomdt.*