'Mosul Question, Lausanne 1922-1923 and after - Papers, despatches, speeches - Hotel de la Mer at Lausanne - Correspondence about oil' [‎228v] (455/501)

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“ With the hill-country from Keni Rash to Sulaimani, even
“ partly under Turkish influence, the tenability of Mosul would at
“ once be called in question.
“ (5.j The retention of Zakho, Arnadia and Rowanduz is considered of great
“ importance on the grounds urged. Regarding Zakho there is no
“ question. Good mountain roads radiate from Amadia, Zakho,
“ Dohuk and Akrah, and the town commands the debouches from
“ the Ser Amadia. These advantages are independent of its value
“ as a base, market and gate to the country of the mountain
“ Assyrians. Rowanduz commands routes to Arbil, Nen, Persia,
“ via Kelishin and Rayat Passes, and to the Rama plain by the
“ Naodasht, Shaur and Balassan valleys. Rowanduz will again be
“ dealt with in comment (c) below.
“ ^c.) The Persian routes to Rowanduz, with their relatively rapid communica-
“ tion, via Lake Urumia and Sharif Khanah with Transcaucasia and
“ Eastern Anatolia South-east Turkey today. , emphasise the importance of retaining hold on
“ Rowanduz.
“ The last few months have proved the beneficial effect in
“ Southern Kurdistan of stability in Rowanduz. It is the natural
“ advanced base for any force acting on the one lateral route of any
“ moment from the south coast—Lake Van Road and Sulaimani.
“ Present relations between Turks and Russians and between Irak
“ and Persia may not bring out its peculiar value at the moment;
“ but it is and will remain a most important strategic point on one
“ of the most dangerous lines of advance on Irak, particularly in so
“ far as concerns Mosul. Both the Kelishin and Rayat Passes and
“ the roads therefrom could be made passable for artillery and motor
“ traffic in about two months.
“ (d.) This object is not difficult to fulfil fairly satisfactorily, as there are many
“ parallel ridges.
“ The acquisition of the Zini-e-Berdi Pass on the main Neri-
“ Rowanduz route is of particular military value.
“ (c.) Though a large proportion of the Assyrians would favour emigration
“ with any reasonable prospects in their new country of adoption,
“ there seems little likelihood that any such desirable solution will
“ be found.
“ It is therefore sound to work on the assumption that they will
“ stay in or close to their own country on the border ; in this case,
“ if their military services are to be secured, their country must be
“ included in Irak boundaries. Failure to take a strong hand on
• • • . O
“ this point m Irak would cause a high rate of desertion and loss of
“ moral in the levies, jeopardising the present situation and closing
“ down a future source of recruitment which the Irak Government
“ cannot replace. For these imperative reasons the inclusion of at
“ least the main portion of their territory is most strongly urged.
“ The ‘ extreme limit ’ boundary (vide section IV of this despatch) requires
“ no more troops for its protection than would one drawn considerably closer in to
“ the plains of Irak, but it has the inestimable advantage of denying to a potential
“ enemy country which, due to its impassable nature, is, from the point of view of
“ large movement of troops, a military ‘ No Man’s Laud,’ but remains at all times
“ ripe for intrigue and consequent tribal trouble, if in the hands of an ill-disposed
neighbour.
IV— New Extreme Limit Suggested.
The line which is shown on the new J-inch map by blue bars and crosses represents
that which would, in my opinion and in that of the Air Officer Commanding and of
the Irak Government, be the best possible frontier from the point of view of Irak. I
shall refer to it in the following portions of this despatch as “the new extreme limit.”
Being drawn up in the light of later knowledge, it differs to some extent from the
“ first proposal” of Sir Percy Cox’s despatch, but it is framed on the principles put
forward in section IV of that despatch which I will here recapitulate.
( 1 .) The treaty frontier, cutting as it does across geographical and tribal divisions,
must make for continual friction and unrest among the frontier tribes.

'Mosul Question, Lausanne 1922-1923 and after - Papers, despatches, speeches - Hotel de la Mer at Lausanne - Correspondence about oil' [‎228v] (455/501)

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'Mosul Question, Lausanne 1922-1923 and after - Papers, despatches, speeches - Hotel de la Mer at Lausanne - Correspondence about oil' [‎228v] (455/501)

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