'Mosul Question, Lausanne 1922-1923 and after - Papers, despatches, speeches - Hotel de la Mer at Lausanne - Correspondence about oil' [‎228r] (454/501)

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Since these words were written circumstances have further strengthened the
argument in favour of the retention of Amadia and the Assyrian country. Not only
have the measures proposed in the Treaty of Shvres for the protection of Christian
minorities not materialised, hut the enlistment of the Assyrians in the British
levy force and their recent employment for the purpose of turning out the Turks from
Rowanduz have made it more than ever difficult to abandon their country to Turkey.
The return of many of the Upper and Lower Tiari and the Tkhuma to then - original
homes, the resultant control by the Irak Government of the relations between them and
their neighbours, the Artoshi Kurd nomads, and the more frequent recourse of the Kurds
of Oramar and Glial to the Irak Governors of Amadia and Mosul, have increased the
cogency of the reasons for the rectifications of the frontier, referred to in Schedule 1
of Sir Percy Cox’s despatch, for the purpose of including the district of Amadia and
the Nestorian country within the confines of Irak. Moreover, the surrender to the
Turks of the homes of the Assyrian mountaineers would almost certainly be the signal
for the collapse of the whole levy organisation. There would, in fact, be a distinct risk
that the Assyrian levies, thinking themselves deserted on all sides, might “ run amok ”
and take to indiscriminate plunder and destruction in the Mosul Vilayet. If it is true,
as stated in your Grace’s telegram, dated the 26th September, 1923, that the Assyrians
have been greatly depressed by the shortening of the period of our treaty with Irak,
and are very anxious about their future under Arab rule. The bulk of them (especially
those from Van and Urumia, now temporarily settled in Amadia) say that they would
prefer emigration. But this does not alter the fact that, if forced to stay in Asia, they
would much rather be under the Arabs, influenced, however remotely, by Great Britain,
than under the Turks. Again, as I have reported in my last- telegram, a large
proportion of the Assyrian mountaineers from the Tiari country and the neighbourhood
are determined in any case to cleave to their homelands and not emigrate. These have
every right to expect that, after employing them to fight our battles, and thus
embittering the Turks against them, we shall secure for their homelands at least
exclusion from Turkey, even if it is not possible for us to arrange for them anv speciallv
privileged position under Irak. However much they may doubt the future goodwill of
the Arabs, they consider that at least they would be less formidable tyrants than the
Turks, and less capable of compassing their destruction.
III.— Military Importance of Rowanduz and other Military Considerations.
I insert here extracts from a note by the Air Officer Commanding setting forth
the military importance of the retention of liowanduz and certain other military
considerations regarding the frontier :—
“ On the assumption that it is desired to retain Mosul in Irak, it becomes
“ necessary :—
“ (a.) To provide, as far as possible, against a future wedge of Turkish or pro-
“ Turkish hill country between the Persian border and the Irak
“ plain from the Jabal Hamrin to Zakho.
“ ( 6 .) To deny road-centres and markets to the Turks, which they could
“ utilise as bases for irregular ‘ band ’ warfare, or, in the event of
“ hostilities, as advanced bases for operations of regular troops.
“ (c.) To retain the important roads from Persia to Rowanduz, via the Rayat
“ and Kelishin Passes.
“ (d.) To select a frontier trace presenting; as far as possible, a line of obstacles
“ which will render menace during winter months very difficult, and
“ to secure command of the defiles giving passage through these
“ obstacles.
“ (e.) To include in Irak the territoiy of the fighting Assyrians, who are not
“ only necessary as soldiers, but if excluded and rendered hostile
“ would prove a serious menace to Irak generally and to the
“ retention of Mosul in particular.
“ To comment on each of these points:—
“ (a.) The latest indication is that the Turks are more interested in Sulaimani
“ and the Kurdish districts than in the Mosul plain. Wild and
“ unproductive as this county is, and possessing only indifferent
“ communications, the best initial method of weakening propaganda
“ and avoiding its Turkification must be to keep the frontier as far
“ north as possible.

'Mosul Question, Lausanne 1922-1923 and after - Papers, despatches, speeches - Hotel de la Mer at Lausanne - Correspondence about oil' [‎228r] (454/501)

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'Mosul Question, Lausanne 1922-1923 and after - Papers, despatches, speeches - Hotel de la Mer at Lausanne - Correspondence about oil' [‎228r] (454/501)

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