'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎386r] (781/1386)

AS 234
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IV.—IT hy we went to Clcsiphon.
The phase of the Mesopotamian campaign winch enued at Ctesijlica is
naturally the one which has excited the most hostile criticism. It is also
the least easy to deleiul. As already shown, when we advanced from Kama
the initiative passed from the Secretary of S.ate to the Government of India ;
similarly, after the battle of Knt-el-Amara the initiative passed from the
Government of India to the General in Command. The hazardous adven
ture to which we wore thus committed could only be justified by complete
success. This fact alone increases the difficulty of presenting a logical and
convincing defence, especially as the Government undoubtedly yielded to an
inexorable sequence of events, combined with external political influences,
strong local pressure, and above all the same fatal attraction of Baghdad
which had lured on the General. It now only remains to explain the course
of events which unhappily tempted the Government to abandon its original
cautious policy.
Kut-el-Amara was captured on the 29th September, Tour days later
the head of the pursuit had reached half way to Aziziyah! On the same
.day (3rd October) General Nixon telegraphed, reporting various movements
and details. His telegram ended thus: —
I consider T am stronj enough to open road to Baghdad* ar,cl with this intention i pi'oposr
, a ) concentrate at Aziziyah.
-* ■* * * # *
“ From military point of view it is highly desirable to capture enemy's steamers -which
cannot get far above Baghdad at this season. ’
On the 4th October the Military Secretary submitted a Minute to the
Secretary of State, from which the following extracts are taken :—
The vidary at Kut-el-Amara is o£ so complete a nature that the idea of pushing on to
Baghdad will certainly bo revived. Pressure will be brought on us. either directly by
Sir John Nixon and Sir Percy Cox, who primn facie are in tiie best position to judge of its
feasibility, or indirectly by an agitation in the Press or in commercial circles. It may even be
urged, and there is much force in the argument, that it is advisable on political grounds on
account of the world-wide prestige which the occupation of Baghdad would confer.”
* # x * =»
u The force under General Nixon comprises two Divisions of Infantry and a Brigade of
Cavalry. This force occupies a considerable area in the midst of a doubtful and possible
hostile population. It also lias to protect important British interests in the Anglo-Persian
oil deals as well as at Bushire and Basra. The consequence is it cannot be concentrated.
v * *.- * *
“ Such a force may be sufficient to expel the Turks from Baghdad. That is a question
which can only be answered by General Nixon on local information, but the problem does not
end at the capture of Baghdad. The city will absorb a garrison of at least a Brigade. This
leaves us only two weak Brigades to cope with any eventuality that may arise.
“ In my judgment it will not be wise to go to Baghdad unless ir? can increase the force by n
whole Division of Infantry and one or two Cavalry regiments, and this we know is impracticabh
unless the Indian troops are withdrawn from France.
“ The conclusion of the whole matter therefore is that we cannot under present circum
stances go to Baghdad, without incurring unjustifiable risks. It must be remembered that
during the winter the Russians are not likely to be able to make any advance into Armenia,
and consequently the Turks can very well spare a division or two from the Armenian army
at this season to reinforce the Mesopotamian troops * *
so l greatly doubt whether we can hold Baghdad for any length of time with our present
force.
“ We have practically no reserves to depend on and we must play a safe game and husband
our sorely strained military resources.
* * * * *
“ Kut-el-Amara is only about 120 miles by road from Baghdad, although by river it is 220
miles, and General Nixon's advance guard, in boats, lias already covered some 20 miles of that
distance. I see no indication of a halt in the pursuit, though in the present state of the river
I also see no probability of being able to overtake the enemy. If we do not stop him. General
Nixon will soon be in Baghdad regardless of orders, and we si all then be faced by the grave
alternative of either having to withdraw again or of making our occupation effective. Either
course involves serious considerations, more especially in view of the gloomy situation in the
near East.”
* * % *
On that same evening (the 4th October) the Secretary of State telegraphed
.as follows to the Viceroy :—
P,—As it appears that owing to difficulties of navigation, there is now little chance of
overtaking and breaking up the retreating Turks, there is no object in pursuing them any
further, and so under these circumstances I shall be glad to learn what Nixon's present
* The italics were not in the original telegram, but as this is the first definite
of i qiug to Baghdad, attention is called to it. V
sutrs'estion