'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎385v] (780/1386)

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We agree with Xixon and propose when he is prepared to give him authority to
advance on Kut.
“As long as his British battalions were kept up to strength and troops were not scattered
along pipe line, he has always considered, in which view we concur, that the occupation of
Kut could be effected by his present force.”
“ Telegram from Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 6th August 1915.
“ The course of action put forward by Xixon, which you recommend, is concurred in by
me, unless, taking into consideration Mailing’s telegram of 3rd August and his speculation
as to objective of gathering at Ispahan, some modification should be thought icquisite by
you. As regards Karun, how are troops distributed and strength ? it is presumed that
the defence of the oilfields against raiders is sufficiently secured by local arrangements at
oilfields and present strength of troops.”
The Viceroy, in a telegram dated 18th August, replied giving in detail
General Nixon’s reasons for not increasing the strength of the force in the
Karim Valley. The arguments employed seemed conclusive and the
advance to Kut was finally sanctioned by a telegram from the Secretary oi'
State, dated 20th August.
In September the forward movement was commenced. On the 15th the
headquarters of the Gth Division reached Abu Rummanab, six miles from
the Es-Sinn position which had been very strongly fortified by the Turks.
The next few days were occupied by reconnaissances prior . to the linal
advance which began on the 26th September. By the 29th, after severe
fighting, the Turks were put to flight and our cavalry had entered Kut-el-
Amara. During the action we captured more than 1,700 prisoners and
13 guns, and inflicted heavy losses in men and materiel.
This brilliant victory concluded a definite phase of the campaign, as by
it the complete occupation of the Basra Vilayat was secured. Kut-el-Amara
had been speciiically suggested by the Viceroy as the goal of our operations
and it had been accepted as such by the Secretary of State. That goal had
been attained by the endurance and valour of the Gth Division of the Indian
Army.
It has been necessary to refer in some detail to the telegrams which have
passed, as they are the only record we have as to the reasons governing the
advance to Kut-el-Amara and Nasiriyeh. Each step in that advance was
apparently initiated by the military and political authorities in Mesopotamia
with the full support of the Government of India, and though the Secretary
of State gave his assent, it was with some reluctance, as in view of our
limited resources he was not fully convinced of the wisdom of extending our
operations so far afield.
The view of Lord Hardinge’s Government was (1) that the occupation of
Amara more completely protected the oil fields and Persian Arabistan;
(2) that Nasiriyeh was necessary to us to counteract Turkish influences
on the lower Euphrates and to protect Basra from another attack on that
flank; (3) that Kut-el-Amara was a better position, as it controlled
strategically the Shatt-el-Hai as well as the Tigris and, moreover, brought
the whole Basra Vilayet within our political sway. Each one of these
contentions is incontrovertible. Had we not occupied Amara, the Turkish
inroad into Persian Arabistan would not have been dispersed with such
crushing effect as it was, nor could we have felt certain that the attempt
would not be repeated. Had we not gone to Nasiriyeh the predatory tribes
on that flank might have been a perpetual thorn in our side, while we
should have been constantly exposed to another Turkish attack on bhaiba
and Basra. Had we not fought and beaten the Turks at Kul-el-Amara they
would have themselves concentrated there in great force last October after
the arrival of their reinforcements, and could then have operated at will
either against Nasiriyeh or against Amara.
These considerations taken separately would appear to have fully justified
at the time the course recommended by the Government of India and accepted
by the Secretary of State.