'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎48v] (96/1386)

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John Nixon ami Sir Percy Cox, who primd facie are in the host position to judge of its
feasibility or indirectly by an agitation in the Press or in commercial circles. It may even
be uroed and there is much force in the argument, that it is advisable on political grounds
on account of the world-wide prestige which the occupation of Baghdad would confer.
Certainly strong arguments can be advanced for its occupation, and the ease with which the
operation can be carried out will be impressed on ns with such cogency and insistance that
the proposal will be difficult to resist. The very glamour attaching to so historic a city is in
itself a temptation, and it is with extreme reluctance that I advocate a policy of caution,
which will certainly be unpopular, and perhaps difficult to justify in the minds of those who
are not intimate with the intricacies of the problem.
# # » #
“ In my judgment it will not be wise to go to Baghdad unless ire can increase the force by a
u-lioh Division oj' Infantnj and one or tiro Cavalry regiments, and this we know is impracticable
unless the Indian troops are withdrawn from France.
“ The conclusion of the whole matter therefore is that we cannot under present circum
stances o-o to Baghdad without incurring unjustifiable risks. It must be remembered that
duriim- the winter the Russians are not likely to be able to make any advance into Armenia,
and consequently the Turks can very well spare a division or two from the Armenian army at
this season to reinforce the Mesopotamian troops.
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“ We have practically no reserves to depend on and we must play a safe game and husband
our sorely strained military resources.
“ If we do not stop him, General Nixon will soon be in Baghdad regardless of orders, and
we shall then be faced by the grave alternative of either having to withdraw again or of
making our occupation effective. Either course involves serious considerations, more
especially in view of the gloomy situation in the near East."
The following day the Secretary of State cabled as follows
From Secretary of State to Viceroy, 5th October 1915.
*. Private. My private telegram of 4th instant. Nixon's advance. Cabinet, to whom
position was reported yesterday, decided to appoint Committee of General Staff, Admiralty,
Foreign and India Offices to consider in all its aspects possibility and policy of advance on
Baghdad. Political reasons were thought to make occupation desirable as isolating Germans
in Persia, if forces available are sufficient to take and hold the place. Barrow thinks we
might be able to capture Baghdad, but that forces weakened by further losses would be
fcstifficient both to hold it ,securely against counter attack and to maintain communications.
Kitchener can hold out no hope of reinforcements from Europe or Egypt. Let me know your
views It was suggested that Japan should be asked to send a Division.
Oil the same day General Nixon telegraphed :— j ?
' r "It is mv view (hat we have in front of us a shaken enemy who has lost 13 guns and is
deficient of ammunition, and for military reasons it is clearly desirable to smash him while
we can. He has taken refuge in a position when* we can manoeuvre, and 1 hope, destroy him.
1 see nothing which would justify letting slip such an opportunity. From a military point of
■XocrwyToighihicl is a focus of Turkish lines of advance and a large supply centre, of which, in
our intei'ests, it is vital to deprive the enemy and this quite apart from any political effect its
occupation might have.
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On 6th October in his H. 82-15, the Viceroy quoted General Nixon’s
views as follows
With reference to my suggestion to open by another general action road to Baghdad, will
you kindly let me know whether my force is to be reinforced to the extent of another
Division from France, in order that my position there may be maintained. Efiect of my
occupying Baghdad would be more than nullified if subsequent events should compel me, in
course of time, to retreat down the river in consequence of reinforcements not being
forthcoming.”
The Viceroy concurred in the above views in the following words :
“In view of German activities in Persia, increasing pressure on Afghanistan, and the
aspect in the Balkans and Dardanelles, we hold that the capture of Baghdad would have such
an effect in the Near East and offers such important political and strategical advantages ns
to justify movement, but to do this at least an additional Division would be required.
Otherwise we do not propose to allow him to go beyond Kut-el-Amara.