'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎48r] (95/1386)

Precis of (^oiresjjondence (‘onnectcd the advimce to
Baghdad prepared in the Military I)e|)artnient of the India
Office.
When on 24th April our troops were still at and soutli of Kurna, the
Secretary of State in his telegram, Xo. 1812 of that date defined the policy
of Government, as follows :—
S
'■ Nixon's demand (for a Cavalry Brigade) implies intention on his part of important
offensive movement. I presume he clearly understands that Government will not sanction at
tlii> moment any advance beyond present theatre of operations. We must confine ourselves
during summer to defence of Basra Vilayat and oil interests in Arabistan. If, after smashing
enemy in Karim direction it is possible to advance to Amara with view to establishing an
outpost which will control tribesmen between there and Karim, and so contribute to securitv
of pipe-line there, I should be prepared to accept such a proposal, provided it is supported bv
you, but I deprecate any plan involving undue extension and possible demands for reinforce
ments. Strategically, our present position is a sound one. and at present we cannot afford to
take risks by unduly extending it. \\ e must play a safe game in Mesopotamia.”
In his Xo^XLX).)S2 of the 27th July, the Viceroy telegraphed : —
The occupation of Kut-el-Amara is considered by us to be a strategic
necessity. . . . Once securely in possession we could probable reduce our garrison at
Na>iri veh and Ama ru, and tlin s economise our troops. . . . We request your sanction to
our authorising INixon to capful 1 Kut-el-Amara. . .
On the 30th July in his 1707, the Secretary of State called attention to
the previous orders.
The Viceroy replied on the 5th August, quoting at length General
Nixon’s views, urging the occupation of Kut-el-Amara. fie endorsed those
views and proposed to authorise the advance on Kut-el-Amara.
On the following day, Mr. Chamberlain in hL 3002 of Gih xVugust,
sanctioned the advance to Kut. The result was the urilliant action oT
Kut-el-Amara and the complete rout of the Turks. By the 3rd October the
Lead of the pursuit had reached as far as Bagheila, and on that date
General Xixon telegraphed as follows:—
consider I ain strong cnougli to open road to Baghdad, and with this intention i propose
to concentrate at Aziziyeh* Bill this concentration must be partlv by land. Families of
Germans and Turkish officials are said to be leaving Baghdad for Aleppo. From militarv
point of view it is highly desirable to capture enemy's steamers, which at this season cannot
get far up stream of Baghdad.
Thereupon the Secretary of State in his 3071 of 4th October replied as
follows>
k-
/
’• 1 shall be glad to know what Nixon's present intentions are, as if, owing to navio-ation
troubles, there is no probability of catching and smashing the retreating enetnv. there is no
object in continuing the pursuit. The orders conveyed in my 1812 of 24th April’ and 3002 of
(jth August still hold good, subject to course of events a< Baghdad and elsewhere, and to the
recommendations you may now make. Please cable your estimate of enemv's present strenoth
in Mesopotamia.”
He also telegraphed privately as follows : —
My official telegram of to-day about Nixon s plans. Your private letter of 10th
September seems to render it imperative to stop Nixon’s further advance. J shall be
grateful for early communication of your views.”
On the same day the Military Secretary submitted a Minute entitled
“ Ihe Mesopotamian Question in its Military Aspect” vide Appendix IV. to
C.l.D. G—, 28 of October which was circulated to the Cabinet.
The following extracts show its tenour : —
rim victory at Kut-el-Amara is of so complete a nature that the idea of pushiim- on to
Baghdad will certainly be revived. Pressure will be brought on us, either directly bv Sir
M.S. 65.
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