'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎34v] (68/1386)

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•• Having placed these alternatives bet'ory yon. I leave the question with confidence for Hi
Majesty's Government to decide, but I trust that the decision will be in favour of the first
alternative."
“ From Secretary of State to Viceroy, dated 21st October 1915.
u Private. Your private telegram of 21st October. Baghdad advance.
" Report of Combined Staffs estimates that Nixon has only some 9,000 Turkish troops and
some irregulars to deal with for next two months; that Turkish forces maybe somewhat
increased by end of year, and they might conceivably reach a total of 00,000 bv end of
January and even larger figures during 191(5. They consider that if reinforced by two Indian
divisions from France he might with assistance of river flotilla face risk of attack by (50,000
but there would remain possibility of enemy receiving further reinforcements at later date ’
Staffs hold, therefore, that it would be unwise from purely militarv point of view to occupy
Baghdad unless military authorities have power to withdraw’droops at once without re mar d to
political considerations if military exigencies make this necessary.
“ r, ' ,ie War Office would give the two Indian divisions, but could not under any circum
stances spare further reinforcements, and are doubtful of their capacity even to supply drafts
if wastage from casualties or sickness is severe. They think Baghdad can be taken easilv and
held for some time, but as explained above it might become untenable later.
“At present moment it seems that German attempt to break through to Constantinople
will succeed, and our position and prospects in Gallipoli are most uncertain. Persia seems
drifting into war on German side whilst Arabs are wavering, and unless we can offer them
gieat inducement will probably join lurks. We are, therefore, in great need of striking 1
success in the East both to check Persian movement and to win Arabs.
It is suggested that we should occupy Baghdad, giving assurances to Arab leade-s tint we
favour creation of Arab State independent of Turks, and that we shall be prepared to consider
future disposition of Baghdad m connection therewith. Is this practicable f She reef of
Mecca will certainly ask for declaration of our intentions as regards Baghdad if we oecuov it
Lnless you consider that possibility of eventual withdrawal is decisive against the advance’
all other considerations seem to us to render it desirable, and we are prepared to order it.” ’
°n the 23rd October another War Council was held, the result of which
was the dehnile order contained in the following telegram :
from the Secretary of State for India to Viceroy, dated 23rd October 1915
2‘ No : , S “”» ' na - v ?'> BoffM"! 'f he satisfied that force he has available i,
sufficient for the operatic,.,. Reinforcement, will take time owing to relief and fans a,it
yyy-W ’™ l t " T " ' lms '0 ns will be sent as soon as possible. 1 will telegraph probable
The telegram was followed up the same day by official letters to the War
L nice and the Admiralty pressing lor the immediate despatch of the
sanctioned reinforcements which were to bring the total force up to four
Divisions and one Cavalry Brigade. ~ ]
I he decision thus arrived at was clearly in accordance with the views of
the Commander-m-Clnef m India tor on the 25th October in a telegram to
the Chief ol the Imperial General Staff, he observed : —
“ From Chief of the General Staff, India, to War Office, dated 25th October 1915
(No. 8. 25298.)
Baghdad, h the best posdffin which m meet them^sbould "brin' Tp m* l) ° l,,g the case >
a reinforcement of two divisions should reach the Tio-.-i •+! • ” muecll,,te b occupied, and
Turkish hands becomes the base forT^i^ wo months. Baghdad in
lines, and for the coercion of Persia ; whilst politically thGf .i]' 1 ' t ^ • lgl 'i and Eu l )]ll> ates
within our grasp would be interpreted throughout Asia PeL'a Aflhan^t ^ t0 b °
weakness.” h ’ 1 eifeia ’ Afghanistan, and the East as
l‘rom the 1st to 11th November the War Office sent half a dewe,
telegrams reporting various Turkish movements from Svl - •
’ Ctesiphon.’’ 8 (H ' C,,p,l ' <l Wlth sli ? ]lt
Staff, War Office pi" 11 '' *' XOn w,ml ,0 tIie Chief of the Imperial General
derGoltz over a fortnight hot nTp^iTldo 'irr a lai 'f-'e force under Von
venoms reasons. Please state the source of your mfomatfon' re I|? rts »« elusive for