'PAPERS RELATING TO THE MESOPOTAMIAN COMMISSION from SIR E. BARROW'S ROOM' [‎34r] (67/1386)

submitlelra^^pplemenHiT - lhe inUta ’Y ^retary, India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. ,
received from Jmlia and fL ("v ..'V N ?. 0,Uie< l" e “ ce oi ' ,ht ' information
which the Committee liq,] / n ' J ! ( 1,1 ^ 1X011 / sll,J;>e( J ,| eiit fo the (iate on
Defence Paper, Secret, O. 31, of olnober 1*®.' < ' 0,m " iUee of lm P orial
previously Mprefstd 11 :- ' 8 IIH,1Cate a certai ' 1 modification of the views he had
Bag},dad, while, if we gret oidy o,!, '' i ni —° f t "i° 1 <1 ’ vlslo 1 HS; 1 ani D^tirely in favour of going to
advisability of raid aiul retii^emen 6 !. 1 Th af 1 iftn t0 l V ^ ""« Ut eonsL/the
thiee cavalry regiments in the Baohdad -uea r -n 11(1,11 ^ ,xou > Wlt}l two divisions and
“ (1) To spoil tlmie » 1 CH ’ mI1 be able -- whatever the Turks may do-
available in the area ^ 7 rem(,vil1 ^ or destroying all stores and transport now
“ (2) r TO m :l 8 the "' ° ff f ™ n 1111 wit., Persia for at least two or three
<■>) To postpone trouble from Afghanistan for that period
. P tl,e l! ^'' a vll V et a "< 1 cilfiehls quiet for a like period.”
x% r 'z* atrrlt'iir'z' r r \r ^ ^ ^
Kut-el-Amara will have worn off. d cnle quickly or the moral effect of
The political effect of eventnll^^tfrenmn't^win' be lv d <,, l’ t^ 1 1 ^ 'of obIl vious to its dangers,
advantages, and, moreover, we should have been ' ’ ' l - f le , le U1 * liave 1>een compensatory
Vedras at Kat-el-Au.a.u. 'Z^ZSZlh
V iceroy s private telegram of that date. The teleo-r t ams n o L I P 7 16
follows :— me^iams jn question were as
" Fl ' oni Viceroy, 21st October 1915.
“ Private. Vour private telegram of 18th instant. Baghdad
Government ol India are in entire aeveemp„+ u- h •
political and strategic advantages of the^aoturo n, d HlS Mu J est .V s Government as to
emphasised by contents of Mr. Marling’s telegram of 15th f Ba ° hdad which
security of India and the security of our frontier ns our fir t ^ ^ Ut WG !' e ^ ard internal
depleted military situation are quite unable to send a further ®~ 0 CCU P a ^ ,01 b aild m our present
troops from India to Mesopotamia f ° lce ° f length of a division of
ns COUSUlting Co “er-in-Chief I consider that there are three alternatives before
“(1) Take and occupy Baghdad. This will nresenf . n ,
VO are guaranteed reinforcements of a full division of troops re, ] " Vdt f T Vev ' P rovid ed that
w,, i ,„„,, t hs f, T u.w. This will he the mo. t g
(-) Attack the i urks, raid Baghdad, capturing the feiv steamers th->t , • ,
ve'easnig the English female captives, destroiing the railwav L'm f n‘’Va 5 °‘' eS ’
clominating the city by river patrols from a camp soup, of Baghdad Tl, -. I . !a '? hdad and
political effect, and the fact that we were not in actual ,ccCt m ' '■»« a go.nl
precipitate the despatch of Turkish reinforcements to recapture Thit S f '"'S 1 !'
point of view, would he only the second best alternative, but it would n ,t -eou -e „d’ t,Ca l
a whole division to carry it out. equne addition of
The Commander-in-Chief from a military point of view dislikes this snlm; t
prefer either (1) or (3). He considers that Baghdad, beiim great centre T
valuable base for whichever side is in possession of it, we must either hold ., U P plles and a
keep well away from it. He does not think that it is possible to ^dominate ‘A it 1,lselves ,? r
Ue should have to be camped close to the suburbs, which in his opinionlivesT HI H e
disadvantages and none of the advantages of occupation. His view is tint 7,nl^ i ,7
Baghdad Turkish reinforcements will be gradually dribbled into it and we may be attack^
111 ; stren ^. ll 1 wlt f boat 'varnn.g unless we are as far away as Kut-el-Amara. Nixon ^oes so fir
as to consider that even without reinforcements his army would be safer in .,,,,7 n \
Baghdad than anywhere south of it, and Commander-in-Chief lavs o-reat stress m, tbp ^ l ° f
of Baghdad-,Samarra railway in that it would prevent any possibility of surprise att/iok Ue
He considers that all our interests he in our holding Baghdad, but recoo-nises that wiThrmt
addition our present (forces) might be driven out of it, and that this might involve a vmw
difficult tuid dangerous retreat down the river. Shortly, he is opposed to a raid on Badidld
followed by a withdrawal. He is strongly in favour of holding Baghdad if reinforcement!
are forthcoming. If they are not forthcoming, he prefers safety of Kut-el-Amara position
He feels, however, that present military situation is such that it may at anv time become*
necessary to occupy Baghdad even with our existing forces, and accept the risk involved
“My own comment upon the Commander-in-Chief s view is that from apolitical point of
view it would be disastrous to be driven out of Baghdad. 1 * ^
“(3) Remain in a defensive position at Kut-el-Amara. This is a course that does not
appeal to us, for it shows weakness which will lie recognised both bv Turks and the tribes'
and may force our hands into advancing after all.
M.S 174. C
we
tv\