File 357/1919 Pt 2 ‘RAILWAYS IN PERSIA’ [‎188v] (381/1150)

4. These considerations have induced me to send to you my telegram of to-dav’
date, since I felt that the terms of Mr. Oliphant’s letter to the War Office of the
1st February, 1926, rendered it essential for me to warn you that the Persian Govern 6
ment might at any moment be committed to simultaneous and possibly prior construe
tion of what we may call the Russian sector of the railway. At the same time I
should wish to qualify this warning by drawing your attention to certain factors
which may intervene to prevent the scheme being, even in its initial stages, carried
into effect. I have remarked above on the exclusion from the direct benefits of the
railway of the more important centres of trade and population. We may expect an
outburst of indignation from the regional interests which have thus been ignored
and this indignation will be increased when it is realised how heavy a burden the rail
way will throw upon the Persian taxpayer. The Persians are at present childishly
optimistic and vague regarding the financial aspect of the line : the Minister of Court
for instance, informed me recently that the construction would cost 163 million
tomans 10,000 Persian dinars, or a gold coin of that value. (over £32 million). I was more appalled than he at this figure, which 1
subsequently discovered, represented not the cost in tomans 10,000 Persian dinars, or a gold coin of that value. but the distance in
farsakhs, 163 farsakhs equalling some 650 miles. That Taimourtache should have
confused the total distance with the total cost indicates that the Government’s
realisation of their impending difficulties is, to say the least, superficial. The actual
construction cost, a rough estimate of which I have obtained from Mr. Poland, is
none the less, formidable enough. It is put at 72 million tomans 10,000 Persian dinars, or a gold coin of that value. (say, £14,400,000)
The Persians confidently expect that this sum can be met, not by a foreign loan, but
by the proceeds of the sugar and tea monopoly, which they calculate'at roughly
£1 million per annum. They appear, however, to have made no provision for tlie
heavy annual deficit which the upkeep and running of the railway will inevitably, and
for a long period, entail. The railway is to be a State railway and this deficit will be
borne on the State budget; it is impossible at present to estimate the extent or dura
tion of this deficit. I gather, however, that Mr. Poland fears that the line will run at
a serious loss for as much as thirty years; nor, when one considers the sparse and
almost uninhabited districts which it will traverse in the lengthy section from Dizful
to Tehran, does this estimate appear exaggerated. Further taxation will be needed to
cover this deficit, and intense indignation will be aroused.
5 These factois may well combine to damp the impulsive optimism which now
prevai.s, nor ani I without hopes that the Persians, once they realise that the northern
sector is likely to flood Tehran with Russian goods and propaganda, will hesitate to
comp e e i until the southern sector is sufficiently a dvanced to come to their rescue.
, i ominan tly for these reasons that 1 hesitate to oppose a scheme on which all
die leading elements m Persia have set their heart and which, in its final form, may
„ S 1 a P e vei P different from that which now arouses our apprehensions. The
i r lca ’ e essential, difficulty of making any such protest must also be examined.
Pvpif^ )re fK tatl0I1S f ^ owe ? er forceful, would in the present mood of Nationalist
pmnln 611 e resen ed and ignored. To render them effective would necessitate the
0± C ^ G1Ye mea sures, incompatible with the desires of His Majesty's
qnri el °-^ 11 J com P a t 1 We with a policy of non-intervention. Not only the
wnnlrl nrnfU i 6 1 ^ J S ’ American Mission, would be outraged; the Russians
be t WfnrVTw 7 by of resentment which would be aroused. It may well
hm the ermeffir f cons ider it imprudent for me to enter any caveat regard-
tronffiv ZtYY H 1 °/ the n ^ rth T n but that you will instruct me to press
strongly for immediate, rapid and continuous construction in the south.
be orefernhWnYim m J own mind, absolutely certain that it would not
interest in the ^nnt}i W Y ^ ersians to come to their own decision. Our overwhelming
established^itselfYri 1 ^ tTes ^°^ d ^ Anglo-Persian oilfields. The company has
lines of eornmnnieoH UZ Y a , n a most 1 as . a ? ' lm pcrium in imperio ; it possesses its own
Persia is almost mm 7 ih, 1 S r™ ac ffi n strat * ori; 'position in a decentralised
alter this Dosition ? Til a 6 ^ lt; really to our advantage to press the Persians to
the construction , a , i,, 6 cl ? m P an y> .1 presume, would gain little commercially from
not conceal mv anvietv TT Tfk’- 11 1 ®.P 0 ?* I l ) le that politically they might lose. I d°
the Ano-lo Persinn ^ ^ atlona l lst Persia should be tempted one day to attack
doseTwhen the main I bnt feel that that evil day may be brought
vinced that from a selfkP ° f f er ? la . flows “ the direction of the fields I am com
advantage arldThil P fi h P ° m of , vlew the centralisation of Persia is not to our
ceiUralfsltion l in k D ° ad T atm g tha t we can or should obstruct that
furtherance; 011 ' reas0n why we shouki intervene in Persian affairs to secure its
U;fu
lfto^ eC
leisT
itidesl®" 1
( lo bring,!
' jUtBlH®®®
jnnidvestor®
;,,ifairP artlc
JdetbShal
:,p itself, wi
bylesoutlie
liltoBstruction
^constructed
Jsteleyelling,
" i firms will
cations will t
liiination v
, penturet
U approva
[i Copies of i
1(201/34]
SirR. Cl
WH referei
A Construct
•^le honour t
¥ from the d
;! if er, that this
^ttbeavailabl
pselyesunfairh
bailed by the
‘^r railways,
Con
*1111
at
la uand

File 357/1919 Pt 2 ‘RAILWAYS IN PERSIA’ [‎188v] (381/1150)

Transcription

About this item

Copyright: How to use this content

File 357/1919 Pt 2 ‘RAILWAYS IN PERSIA’ [‎188v] (381/1150)

Transcription

About this item

Use and share this item

Copyright: How to use this content