Coll 30/9 'Persian Gulf: Administration Reports 1926-1938' [‎410v] (825/1028)

but on his return journey, was intercepted by an overwhelming force which
had seized all wells and was thus able to force an engagement.
In September and at long last the forces of Bin Saud began to show signs
of life. The Awazim a strong tribe in Hassa were reinforced by regulars, and
ordered to move north and pin the rebels on the Southern frontiers of Kuwait.
Another concentration (tribal) was formed at Haffar al Atz, and ibn Musaad
collected a fofce of 3,000 ( inen at Ajibba S. W. of the Bashuk. The King himself
was devoting his attention to the important Ataiba of whom a large section
had at last raised the standard of revolt. He however managed matters in
the west with consumate skill, and succeeded in creating open discord among
his adversaries.
On the 5th October al-Duwish fell upon the Awazim at Ingair in central
Hassa and won a complete victory. The Awazim surrendered on the 10th
October, the rebel commander agreeing that the Awazim should proceed to
Kuwait and remain there. The rebel losses in killed numbered 84 and that of
the Awazim 250, both high figures for an Arabian battle. The rebels captured
8,000 of the Awazim camels and much other loot. Bin Sand’s commander
Mohomed al-Suhalli escaped from the field of battle with five attendants.
“ Ingair ” gave the rebels the province of Hassa but as a set off to their victorv
came the news that the King had also had an overhelming success in west Nejd
and had definitely eliminated the Ataiba from the contest. This was bad news
for the rebels, as the belief that the Ataiba would eventually succeed had
hitherto not been doubted.
On 30th October Duwish sent in and asked to see the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. and
the Shaikh of Kuwait. He followed up his request by crossing the border
and camping at Jahrah. Acting on instructions al-Duwish was told to imme
diately withdraw. It transpired he wished to ask the following three questions
of H. M. Government which duly reached the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. by letter :
(1) If he moved into Nejd, and left his women and cattle in North
Hassa would H. M. Government promise not to bomb them or
allow ’Iraq tribes to attack them.
(2) Should ibn Musaad attacked his women from west during his
absence, would H. M. Government permit them to take refuge in
Kuwait territory and remain under the Shaikh’s protection.
(3) If any of his people shot down an aeroplane of Bin Sand’s manned
by an Englishman, would H. M. Government hold the rebels
responsible.
On the questions being referred to H. M. Government, the Political Agent A mid-ranking political representative (equivalent to a Consul) from the diplomatic corps of the Government of India or one of its subordinate provincial governments, in charge of a Political Agency. was
told to give a rather vague negative answer to the first two, and a positive
reply to the third.
H. M. Government ’s attitude deeply disappointed the rebel leader, and he
^ essage to the Politi cal Agent and the Shaikh to the effect that as
D. M Government was clearly on the side of Bin Sand, and as he could not
possibly invade hejd proper and try final conclusions with the King, if his
women, supplies, camels, and base generally would be at the mercy’ of the
Iraq tribes and with the tacit consent of the British Government, he had no
course left but to make as good terms as he could with the King.
Undoubtedly the above reply of H. M. Government, *may be said to have
marked the collapse of the rebellion. From that day al-Duwish entirely
disillusioned not only made not the slightest effort to fight the King’s forces,
u openn advised and exhorted any one who so wished to leave him and make
sepai ate peace with Bin Saud. Though the rebels had a sufficient quantity of
supp ies and munitions to carry on a long war, the collapse of the Ataiba made
it vitally necessary for them to invade Nejd and beat ~ Bin Saud in the field,
ii' ,r ’ s veiled statement that they would not undertake to prevent
ie laq tribes fiom attacking his women and seizing his camels and supplies
generally m his absence was accepted as tantamount to their saving they would
encourage such action, so further operations against Nejd became obviously
impossible.
7 n i^oa November saw the rebel forces retire to the centre of the Garaa
‘ o bd miles from the Kuwait border, and their numbers gradually dwindle
away.