‘GAZETTEER OF PERSIA VOL. I Comprising the Provinces of ASTARÁBÁD, SHÁHRUD-BÚSTAN, KHÚRÁSÁN, AND SÍSTÁN’ [‎255r] (516/722)

The despotic and venal system of government, which has long prevailed
in Persia, has not subdued the spirit of the natives of that kingdom ;
nor has it impoverished them in that degree which might have been
expected. The ministers and chief nobles appear to be in the enjoyment
of affluence ; and all persons in the public service seem to have ample means
of supporting themselves and their families. Some of the merchants and
principal inhabitants of towns are possessed of considerable property; and
among the other classes of the people, though few are rich, there seem
to be hardly any in actual want. The latter may, in a considerable degree,
owe this exemption from penury to their fine climate and productive soil,
and to their industry and frugal habits. But in Persia, as in other coun
tries, falsehood and deceit keep pace with tyranny and injustice; and the
abuses of the government, and the constant changes to which it is
exposed, appear to have more effect upon the moral than on the physical
condition of the people. In Persia every man complains of his poverty
and of the violence of the governments; but this complaint as often pro
ceeds from a desire to avoid oppression as from its actual pressure. The
system is bad, and those who suffer from it naturally hate the persons by
whom it is administered ; and to this feeling, which is destructive of all
social ties between the rulers and those whom they govern, we may, in a
great degree, attribute the constant recurrence of those internal troubles in
Persia, which have for so long a period exposed that country to a succes
sion of civil wars and revolutions.
The character of the persons entrusted with the government of prov
inces must always have a considerable influence on the happiness and
prosperity of the people. The satraps of ancient Persia appear to have
had the same power as the ‘ beglerbegs ^ of modern times. The khalifahs,
while they held that kingdom, divided it among military leaders; and the
conquerors from Tartary, who established their sovereignty over it, pursued
the same system, but employed the princes of their own families in these
high stations. Some of the Safavian kings adopted this policy ; but the
last monarchs of that race confined their sons to the harem, as is the
modern usage of Turkey ; and, with the hope of increasing their revenue
and of preventing rebellion, they nominated men of low birth and civil
pursuits to the office of superintendents or farmers of provinces. The
consequence has been shown. Tranquillity was obtained, but the empue
weakened. Nadir Shah and his immediate successors employed military
chiefs in all the principal governments; and Fateh Ali Shah divided
almost the whole of Persia among his sons. But he placed with these
princes viziers, or ministers, whom he considered in a great degree respons
ible for the internal government of the province. In some cases a
separate person is appointed superintendent of the revenue; and theie is
almost always an officer nominated by the crown to command the troops.
It appears very difficult to pronounce on the merits of these opposite
systems. That now pursued is certainly the most generous. But though
the conduct of royal governors, who desire to attach those under then rule,
and who are above being the mere purveyors of an avaricious couit, may
give present prosperity to the kingdom, the extent of futuie danger cannot
be concealed. On the occurrence of an accident to then common parent,
whom they obey from habit and from duty, their condition becomes
critical, if not desperate; and submission even to an eldei brother is no
security against their continuing an object of his suspicion. In such