‘GAZETTEER OF PERSIA VOL. I Comprising the Provinces of ASTARÁBÁD, SHÁHRUD-BÚSTAN, KHÚRÁSÁN, AND SÍSTÁN’ [‎254v] (515/722)

vested with his authority, is essential ; and it is generally sought by the
most corrupt means. It is quite impossible to define the exact nature of
^ which varies with the character of the chief ruler and ot tliose
whom he employs, and whicli is more or less oppressive, as he is moderate
and just, or venal and rapacious. In a country where the law, as it is
termed, is administered in so summary a manner, and where decisions are
given at the moment and upon a hurried examination of facts, men with
the best intentions may often pronounce an unjust sentence ; and those
who desire to screen guilt, or to punish innocence, have the easy means of
■doing so under the form of justice. The principal check upon the conduct
of subordinate governors is an appeal to the throne, which those whom
they oppress can always make, as no person can prevent an individual in
Persia from seeking that relief ; and when he reaches court, he is certain
of attention. For, supposing even that there is no disposition to redress
the injured, it is by an accumulation of these complaints against the
governors of provinces and cities that the king and his ministers furnish
themselves with matter of accusation, which either affords a pretext of
removing and plundering the party accused, or of compelling him to share
with them the spoils he has obtained by the abuse of his power. It
is impossible, for the most virtuous public officer to guard against these
accusations, which are often brought forward by the intriguing efforts of
his enemies; and when the court is corrupt, innocence is no security. Men
in high stations, therefore, may be said to be compelled to violence and
extortion by the character of the system. They must provide themselves
with the only means by which they can satisfy the cupidity of their
superiors, and save themselves from disgrace and punishment.
The same species of corruption which prevails in the judicial adminis
tration pervades that of the collection of the revenue; but oppression in
this branch is attended with more difficulty, as it is not unusual for whole
villages and districts to rise against it; and when the distance prevents
their going in a body to the capital, they send deputies. This proceeding
is seldom adopted with a hope of obtaining redress; but it is almost certain
to stop the progress of abuse; for no person, unless very powerfully sup
ported, dare continue to oppress those who have carried their complaints
before the king.
The situation of the public officers in Persia, from the highest to the
lowest rank, appears precarious and full of anxiety and danger ; yet there
is no country in which employment is more eagerly sought. It always
gives consequence, and sometimes wealth; and all who attain it seem
desirous of grasping as much as they can without a very flagrant violation
of law and justice. The higher ranks are in some degree restrained by a
regard for that popularity which gives them strength ; and the lower
by a fear of the punishments which follow detection and exposure. The
situation of the petty magistrates and collectors of districts, between
rapacious and violent superiors, who desire to exact more than the revenue,
and a rude and turbulent populace, who are reluctant to pay even just
dues, must, however, be very miserable. Once a prince, who was
governor general of Ears, called upon the officers of his court to know
what punishment he should inflict upon a very notorious thief, who had
just been seized. “ Make him,” said a noble, whom age and the loss of
his sight had privileged to speak his sentiments with freedom, “ the
manager of a district in Ears. I can conceive no crime,” he added, “ for
which such an appointment would not be an adequate punishment.”