Report of the Special Mission to Egypt under Lord Milner, and related papers [‎209v] (421/473)

6
A return to Cromerism pure and simple is impossible. One cannot put the clock
back a quarter of a century. We have educated a large class of intelligentsia, whose
existence has entirely changed the face of the problem. Many of these are highly
educated, and many most capable administrators under British guidance. The
fundamental mistake since Lord Cromer’s time has been that we have not allowed
sufficient outlet for the activities of this growing class. Instead of seeing their
opportunities for service—and incidentally for lucrative positions—increase in
ratio with their educational advancement, they have seen the numbers of English
officials constantly growing. Young men are still being poured into this country
and these young men must obviously be offered some career. Hence there seems no
hope of finality in the process and no chance of coming into their own in the matter
of loaves and fishes. I am aware that the structure of Government is much more
complicated now than in Lord Cromer's time, and that therefore a larger number
of Englishmen is required, but I certainly think that importation has been carried
to an excess and that this point should be more carefully watched in the future.
A return to a form of Cromerism would not, however, be outside the region of
practical politics under certain circumstances which may well arise. If Saad Zaghlul
breaks the present National Ministry by his uncompromising demands for further
concessions from His Majesty’s Government a new situation will have arisen. A
new Ministry will have to be formed which will depend entirely on British support,
and the British Cabinet will be honourably quit of their engagements under the
Milner agreement. It may even prove necessary to deport Saad Zaghlul once more,
but in this event it would be well to make the deportation a final banishment on the
Arabi precedent. Action firm, decisive and final must be taken, and His Majesty’s
Government’s definite policy as regards this country announced without delay. It
would be possible to go back simply to the status and Constitution of 1913, but I
think something wider than this and more in accordance with the spirit of the Milner
proposals would be advisable. It must not be forgotten that a more autonomous
regime has been promised them, but this is not incompatible with continued British
control over the more important activities of Government. Amongst other things
the odious name “ protectorate ’' should go and the Assembly should be given some
wider powers.
1 am assunfing hitherto that if the present Cabinet falls a Saad Cabinet is
unthinkable. He would have placed himself in such a position of antagonism to
His Majesty’s Government that a Cabinet under his presidency The name given to each of the three divisions of the territory of the East India Company, and later the British Raj, on the Indian subcontinent. would create an
unworkable situation.
The alternative is for Saad Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. to be broken by the present Cabinet. 1 do not
mention their possible collaboration, as it seems most unlikely to come off, and if it
did, would mean virtually political suicide on Saad’s part after his much trumpeted
intransigeance. If the present Cabinet withstand Saad, the negotiations will take
place in London. I do not think it could be too strongly impressed from here on His
Majesty’s Government that it would be the most fatal error to go back on what is
virtually an offer of the Government’s to Egypt. Details may be modified and safe
guards added, but in its general line the scheme should not be broken in Downing
Street. If an agreement is come to, it will still have to be ratified by an Egyptian
Assembly, and I feel that there is a most excellent chance that it would never be
ratified, as the proposals have created genuine alarm in a large body of people, and
Prince Ibrahim’s letter to the “ Times ” voiced the opinion of thousands who would
never have the courage to utter it. These people, if they wish to prevent the agree
ment, will join themselves to the extremists and make impossible demands for the
Soudan, &c. If the Assembly refuses to ratify the agreement His Majesty’s Govern
ment can once more start again with a clean slate.
Should, however, the agreement be ratified we must see it through. The evils of
throwing over the Milner Commission appear to me greater than the evils of the
experiment to be tried under it. British officials they will not be able to do without,
and those that remain will, I am convinced, after some six months or so gradually
begin to acquire more influence than they have, many of them, ever had in the past.
The great necessity, however, in the event of the agreement failing is to have a
definite and distinct policy announced. All the evils of the past few years have come
from this lack of decision. So long as our intentions are undefined Egyptians are
encouraged to shout their demands, and being Orientals they naturally ^pitch their
demands much higher than anything they ever expect to receive. ’ The Milner
proposals staggered the country as being far beyond anything they had ever dreamed
of, and in the case of many, as I have already said, they were horrified at having