Papers on British policy and the Arab movement [‎161r] (325/380)

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obtain. On the new basis the Arabs would gain more in Syria than they would lose in
Kurdistan, and we shall have an opportunity of suggesting it if and when we recognise
King Husein as “ King of the Arabs,” which will be a change from a territorial to a
national title. If he subscribes to “ self-determination,” His Majesty’s Government
will be in a stronger position for handling the difficulties between him and the other
independent Arab rulers to whom they are committed—especially Bin Saud.
(ii.) Arab Federation.
We should be well advised not to make up our minds on this question till we see
whether the different Arab countries opt for the same assisting Power or for different;
Powers in different cases. If both Syria and Mesopotamia opted for us, it would be an
advantage to have some very loose political connection between them and the Hejaz.
This could be arranged by obtaining the appointment of sons of King Husein to the
Syrian and Mesopotamian thrones.
(viii.) Caliphate.
We should abstain from all direct action, whether covert or avowed; but we can
influence the choice of the Moslem world indirectly—for example, by our policy in regard
to Constantinople.
(ix.) Arabian Peninsula, excluding Hejaz.
The principles of self-determination and free choice of assistance apply here also,
but we should make it clear that our existing treaties and relations with various
independent chiefs are pre-eminently applications of this principle, since we have
never exercised coercion in establishing them. We should obtain a formal recognition
from the other parties to the Peace Conference of such existing treaties, and of our
exclusive right to make similar treaties with the remaining rulers of the Peninsula,
if they on their side are willing to make them with us.
(x.) Hejaz.
We shall have to take up again with the French Government the abortive
negotiations of 1917, and endeavour to obtain their agreement to the principle that
their direct relations with the Hejaz Government shall be restricted entirely to
pilgrimage affairs.
If the French can be induced to agree to this, a precedent will be set against
which it will be difficult for Italy, Holland, and lesser Moslem Powers to stand out.
The French will probably try to obtain our assent to French economic penetration
of the Hejaz (and especially to the installation of a French bank at Jeddah) in
return for a recognition on their part of our political priority. But we should be
well advised to resist such suggestions, since they would open the way for a return
of French influence by another channel.
It may be impossible to embody any of these arrangements regarding the Hejaz
in formal instruments binding upon all parties concerned.
(xi.) Mesopotamia,
We shall be on safe ground here in taking our stand upon the principle of free
option, since it is evident that the inhabitants do not wish us to withdraw.
We could also put forward our ancient commercial relations with the country, and
claim our right to extend the Pax Britannica from the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , where the
benefits of our presence are admitted by all, to its Mesopotamian hinterland. This
historical line of argument might, it is true, give an opening to the traditional claims of
France in Syria and Palestine, and would in appearance traverse our general line of
policy, which is to rest the settlement, not on the claims of outside Powers, but on the
self-determination and free choice of the native populations. Nor would a recital of
benefits conferred in the Gulf carry much weight if it did not appear to impress a
population that was neighbour to the Gulf and had had an opportunity of witnessing
our activities there for the past hundred years.
The desire of the people of Mesopotamia for us to remain there is really the best
proof that our past work in the Gulf has been as good as we assert, and our case
ultimately stands or falls by it, whichever line of argument we take. We had
therefore better take our stand regarding Mesopotamia upon the choice of the inhabitants,
which is not, after all, in doubt. Nevertheless, it may become necessary to proclaim a
sort of Monroe Doctrine, in our favour, in regard to these regions. It seems imperative
[920—1] G