Papers on British policy and the Arab movement [‎156v] (316/380)

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break the peace over questions of demarcation and tribal allegiance, over which sea-power gives us no
control.
If we undertake to keep the peace throughout the Peninsula, we must therefore be prepared, in^*
the last resort, to intervene directly on land, not only in case of aggression by outside Powers, but for
the enforcement of our awards between the Arab rulers themselves.
This problem has already been raised by our Treaty with Bin Saud, and by the difficulties that
have arisen in the interior between him and King Husein.
2. The Hejaz.
It is extremely desirable that the Hejaz Government should accept a treaty with
His Majesty s Government embodying an arbitration clause, since, if any one
Government in the Peninsula remains outside the trucial system, the effectiveness
of the whole system is endangered.
On the other hand, Great Britain would find it difficult to apply the same sanctions
as in other parts of the Peninsula, since any landing of troops in the Hejaz, or even a
blockade of the coast (especially in the pilgrimage season) would excite Moslem feeling against us
everywhere ; and a treaty giving us the right to do this would be regarded as a betrayal of independence
on the part of any ruler of the Hejaz who concluded it.
As regards the renunciation of relations with any outside Power except His Majesty's Government,
there would be less occasion for a clause providing against alienations of territory or concessions,
since the ruler of the Hejaz would be debarred from alienating any of the sacred territory to a
non-Moslem Power by Moslem opinion, and concessions to foreign subjects, even if they were operated
through Moslem employees, would also be very unpopular (though the case might arise if other
districts, e.y., Maan, Akaba, Kunfida, were added to his direct dominions). Our main object might
be obtained by a clause debarring the ruler of the Hejaz from leasing or alienating the sacred
territory to any Power whatever, without that exception in favour of ourselves which, in the case
of the Hejaz, would be offensive to Moslem opinion. But the question of concessions is more difficult,
since public works will be needed in the Hejaz, and demanded by the inhabitants, which it will be
impossible to carry out without foreign participation.
The elimination of all political relations with outside Powers except through His Majesty’s
Government is of course entirely out of the question in the case of the Hejaz. This element in a
trucial treaty can only be reconciled with independence in cases in which the external relations
of the local Government contracting are in fact almost exclusively with the British Empire.
But in the Hejaz the presence of the Holy Cities, and the annual pilgrimage to them, creates
relations of the highest importance between the Hejaz Government and every Power in the
world which has Moslem subjects. The fact of these relations constantly puts the independence
of the Hejaz to the test, and an attempt by Great Britain to become a recognised intermediary
in these relations would not be tolerated by other Powers, or by the Islamic world, even if the
ruler of the Hejaz were willing to countenance it himself. On the other hand, it would be
unfortunate if His Majesty’s Government’s special trucial rights were to be confined to relations
between the ruler of the Hejaz and his Arab neighbours, and we should aim rather at obtaining a
clear recognition from other outside Powers that their direct relations with the Hejaz should extend
to questions affecting the Pilgrimage, and to these alone.
In the Hejaz. then, British desiderata seem to be limited to the conclusion of a
‘‘ trucial treaty ” on a restricted basis, and for the maintenance of predominant influence
we have to depend in part upon our present relations with King Husein, our position in
Egypt and the lied Sea, and the relations we hope to establish with the surrounding
Arab countries.
3. Mesopotamia (Irak and parts of Jezireh).
In this country the backward state of the population, its religious and social
disunity and past misgovernment, combined with the potential resources of the country,
their present neglect, and the great undertakings necessary to develop them, make a
“ trucial system inadequate, and necessitate the conduct of internal administration by
a foreign Power-—at any rate, for a transitional period, the duration of which it is
impossible to define.
It is a British desideratum that this should devolve, to the exclusion of all other
Powers, upon Great Britain. And since the necessity is as great in Jezireh as in
Irak, and parts of .Jezireh are geographically hardly separable from Irak, it is a British
desideratum that British administration in Mesopotamia should extend to such parts of
Jezireh also.
On the other hand, His Majesty’s Government have stated that they do not desire
to annex Mesopotamia, partly because they do not wish to commit themselves before
hand to permanent political and military liabilities of such wide scope, and partly
because they are anxious to give play to th* Arab national revival when and where it
is accompanied by the capacity to realise itself in an effective way.