Papers on British policy and the Arab movement [‎156r] (315/380)

11
(4.) Arab Countries (as enumerated in Part One, Section (4)) and Kurdistan :—
- (a.) Subject to the maintenance of existing British interests and obligations
(“ Bbglements organiques ” of the Lebanon Ydlayet, Aden and Bahrein protectorates,
possible enlargement of Aden protectorate (see article 10 of No. 11: Anglo-French Agree
ment of the 16th May, 1916) and treaties with Sultans of Mokalla and Maskat, Chiefs of
“ Trucial Oman A name used by Britain from the nineteenth century to 1971 to refer to the present-day United Arab Emirates. ,” Sheikhs of Koweit, Mohammerah, and Al Katar, Bin Saud, the Idrisi,
&c.), that the Arab countries should, as far as possible, be independent under effective
Governments, acceptable to the British Empire, and at peace with one another and with
outside Powers.
The federation of the independent Aral) States is a question for the Arabs themselves. It is a
British desideratum in so far as the establishment of a united independent Arab Power (even though
merely nominal) might counteract any odium we may incur with Moslem opinion as the chief agents
in the overthrow of the Ottoman Empire (the sole remaining representative of Islamic power and
independence before the war). On the other hand, this rather imponderable advantage would have to
be balanced against the possible detriment to the peacefulness and effectiveness of the independent
Governments which a premature attempt at federation might involve. And Great Britain could not
allow a precarious federal scheme to prejudice the “ trucial ” relations between herself and various
independent Arab rulers, by which the peace is effectively kept already over a considerable part of the
Arabian peninsula. Nor could she admit that the establishment of a federation should prevent the
extension of “ trucial ” relations to other local Arab Governments with which she is not yet in treaty
relationship, if such extension appeared necessary for the effective maintenance of peace over the
whole Arab area.
The reassumption of the Caliphate by an Arab house is a question for the Arabs to settle with
other Moslems, and His Majesty’s Government can take no open initiative in the matter. At the
same time, it is desirable from the British point of view that the Caliphate should be transterred by
a consensus of Moslem opinion from the Turks to the Arabs. The only other British desideratum in
regard to it is that it should be kept distinct from the questions of Arab independence and Arab
federation, discussed above.
(b.) In the independent Arab countries, whether federated or not, it is a British
desideratum that there should be the least possible intervention, both in internal
administration and in inter-State relations, by outside Powers.
But where outside intervention is necessary—as, for example, in the administration
of Syria, Irak, and Jezireh, and in the relations between Arab Governments involving
questions of tribal allegiance or the demarcation of boundaries (i.e., questions calculated
to disturb the peace)—it is desirable that, except in Syria, where the question must be
left open for the moment, this intervention should as far as possible be the monopoly
of the British Empire.
The grounds of this claim are as follows: The peace of the Arab countries is a vital interest of
the British Empire; it can only be maintained by a trucial system; a trucial system to be effective
must be in the hands of a single Power, since, if the responsibility is divided, the local rulers who are
to be kept in order will attempt to maintain anarchy by playing off one mediator against the other;
and if this position is to be a monopoly, Great Britain has an overwhelming claim to it as the Power
with the greatest interests in this area and the neighbourhood, and as the only Power which has
established a trucial system in any part of Arabia hitherto.
On the other hand, this claim to a special political position in the Arab countries does not imply
a similar economic claim in the same area. His Majesty’s Government will continue to take all
legitimate official action for preserving and increasing British trade and concessions in their Arabian
territories and protectorates, and in the independent Arab countries, but they do not aim at securing
a paramount economic position in the whole of this area by means of a political monopoly.
British desiderata in the Arab countries may be summed up as a British Monroe
Doctrine for Arabia, but with certain qualifications, which appear when these desiderata
are analysed province by province.
III.— Desiderata, in the different Arab Countries (including Kurdistan).
1. The Arabian Peninsula, excluding the Hejaz.
Independence for all effective local Governments, and the conclusion of treaties,
on the “ trucial pattern ” (see Part One, Section III), with all that have not already
made treaties or agreements with Great Britain.
It is to be noted that the rulers with whom His Majesty’s Government had treaties before the
war were nearly all coastal chiefs, with no hinterland except the uninhabited south-easterni desert, and
therefore without suzerainty over Bedouin tribes. Their subjects lived by pearl fishing and coastal
trade, and breaches of the peace on their part generally occurred at sea.
His Majesty’s Government therefore made it their practice to limit their rights and obligations,
under these treaties, to the keeping of the peace at sea.
On the other hand, the rulers with whom His Majesty’s Government have made treaties during
the war, are mostly chiefs of inland tribes and oases, drawing their power from the interior and apt to