Papers on British policy and the Arab movement [‎149v] (302/380)

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French obstruction, based on the Treaty of 1844 (sec paragraph 38 above), prevented
effective actioil at Maskat, the distributing centre of the whole traffic ; and so long
as the centre remained intact, action on the circumference was difficult and ineffectual.
Eventually, in 1910, we found it necessary to establish a naval blockade in the
Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. , with the object of preventing "the transit of arms from the Arabian to
the Persian Coast. This measure, which was maintained right up to the outbreak of
the war, was a cumbrous and costly expedient; but it achieved a large measure of
success, and went so far towards killing the traffic that the French Government
thought it advisable to come to terms on the Maskat question. W e bought out the
French arms dealers for 60,0O0Z., and acquired liberty of. action to regulate the trade
at Maskat. This arrangement was reached only a few months before the outbreak of
the war. The whole question of the control of the arms traffic after the war was
considered by a Sub-Committee of the War Cabinet which reported in March 1917.
The Sub-Committee regarded the matter as one “ of vital importance to the future of
the British Empire,” and urged that it should be raised at the Peace Conference ” as
a high moral issue of the utmost consequence to civilisation in general. ’ Of their
specific recommendations the most important were as follows :—
(1) that a preliminary understanding should be arrived at between Great Britain
and France with a view to securing bond fide co-operation in any
restrictive measures that might be introduced ;
(2) that undertakings should be obtained from all Powers represented at the
Conference not to sell or alienate their surplus stock of arms, and to
regulate the manufacture, sale, and export of certain classes of weapon
as well as of ammunition of all kinds ;
(3) that a new international Convention should be negotiated to replace the
ineffectual “ Brussels Act” of 1890, for the regulation of the traffic in
what may be described as the “ danger zone,” those parts of Asia and
Africa in which it is of special importance to prevent modern arms and
ammunition from reaching the hands of the indigenous races.
50. The above recommendations have received the cordial support of the Govern
ment of India, and their adoption is very desirable from the point of view of Indian
interests. The first step, if the procedure advocated by the Sub-Committee is to be
followed, would be to approach the French Government with a view to arriving at the
“preliminary understanding” contemplated in (1). It is particularly desirable to
secure the regulation of the traffic at Jibuti in French Somaliland, which, in the past,
has been second only to Maskat as a distributing centre. France has a strong interest
in maintaining the trade at Jibuti, which represents a considerable source of income
to the local French administration ; and so long as she retains the port, it is doubtful
whether restrictive measures of a permanently effective character will ever be intro
duced. It would be worth paying a high price for the cession of Jibuti to Great
Britain, if France could be brought to consider such a transaction. Failing that, we
must endeavour to persuade the French Government, if not to suppress the traffic at
Jibuti altogether, at any rate to bring it under strict regulation.
India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. ,
4 th December 1918.