Papers on British policy and the Arab movement [‎149r] (301/380)

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littoral (Koweit, Bahrein, the Trucial Chiefs, &c.), as well as of our. predominant
position in the Gulf generally. That such a course would have some advantages
need not be denied. It would regularise once for all a position resting on a
prescriptive rather than a juridical basis. On the other hand, oar predominance
in the Gulf, created as it has been by nearly a century of sustained effort and
sacrifice, is not seriously challenged in any quarter. It was publicly proclaimed
by Lord Lansdowne in 1903 and by Sir Edward Grey in 1907 ; and on neither
occasion was anyone found to dispute it. Since then we have expelled the Turks
from the whole Gulf region, and have thus rendered our position more unassailable
than ever. The facts speak for themselves. We cannot allow that they are open
to argument or discussion ; nor can we submit to international arbitrament, however
perfunctory, a cardinal article of British policy which we are resolved to maintain
at all costs. The case against raising the question at the Peace Conference seems
decisive.
6.—China and Japan.
40. The general question of Japanese policy in China lies somewhat outside the
scope of Indian interests. But it is very desirable, from the Indian point of view,
that Japan should not be permitted to establish herself, politically or commercially,
in the two Chinese provinces of Szechuan and Yunnan, which border on Tibet and
the Indian Empire. If, in return for compensation elsewhere, Japan could be
induced formally to recognise that these two provinces and Tibet itself lie outside her
sphere of influence, it would be a great advantage.
47. Secondly, the possibility has been suggested that France, exhausted by the
war and faced with new and exacting responsibilities in other directions, may find
herself unable to maintain her position—already none too strortg—in Indo-China,
and may seek for some means of relieving herself of the burden. There is also the
question of the Dutch East Indies, where there are indications that the hold of the
Dutch authorities has been materially weakened. Should either of these regions
pass from the hands of their present possessors, it is important, from the Indian
point of view, that their new owner should not be Japan. In the Dutch East Indies
we already possess, under treaty with Holland, a reversionary right to certain specified
areas in the event of their abandonment by the Dutch.
48. As regards China herself, the principal outstanding question, so far as India
is concerned, is that of Tibet. The present position of this question has been briefly
sketched in an earlier section of this Memorandum (see paragraph 2S). For the
moment the situation has improved. After years of desultory warfare, hostilities
between the Tibetans and Chinese have at length been suspended, through the good
offices of a British Consular officer, and a provisional boundary has been laid down
which the local Chinese and Tibetan military authorities have agreed to respect. But
the central Chinese Government shows little disposition to confirm the provisional
arrangement. It is true that these outlying regions are at present beyond the
effective control of Peking, and that, unless and until the central Government
succeeds in restoring its authority, the recent truce is likely to be maintained locally.
But there can be no permanent security until the whole position has been regularised ;
and it is very desirable that the Chinese Government should be brought into line
with as little delay as possible. It is not suggested that the question should be
formally raised at the Peace Conference, or that Tibetan affairs should be made the
subject of international discussion. But China, as an Allied Power, will be
represented at the Conference, and it is possible that an opportunity may arise for
informal conversations between British and Chinese representatives which would
pave the way to a satisfactory settlement of this long-standing controversy.
7.—Arms Traffic.
49. The interest of India in the control of the arms traffic is well known. For many
years before the war modern rifles and ammunition found their way via Maskat and
the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. to the tribesmen of the North-West Frontier Region of British India bordering Afghanistan. and adjoining regions ;
but it was only from about the year 1900 onwards that the traffic assumed really
alarming proportions, and brought about conditions which, as the Government of India
reported in 1909, “ have upset the balance of power, and constitute a serious menace to
the maintenance of peace.” Various palliatives were attempted with indifferent success.