Papers on British policy and the Arab movement [‎115r] (233/380)

Wilson says in his telegram 9926 of the 17th November: “ If the future status of this
“ country is to be dealt with successfully, it must, I am convinced, be treated
independently of Arab problems elsewhere. Arabs of Mesopotamia will not tolerate
“ that Arabs from elsewhere should have any say in their affairs, whether they come
“ from Syria or from Ilejaz. In practice they dislike and distrust both. National
“ unity means for them united Mesopotamia, and not unity with either Syria or
“ Ilejaz.” And Sir P. Cox had already said : “ The Naqib of Baghdad considers
“ himself superior in purity of descent and nobility to the Sherif, and no less
“ important; and the introduction of a relative of the Sherif of Mecca as head of the
“ State of Iraq would, in my opinion, be greatly misunderstood and resented by the
“ Naqib and his family, and thus tend to alienate our most potent element of influence
“ over the Arabs of Iraq."
8. These are the views of our responsible officers, and if they are correct (and
there is no new evidence to make them less correct that when the Eastern Committee
approved Sir P. Cox’s proposals in April last) Shereef Abdullah would not be accepted
by the Arabs of Iraq as King, and would greatly embarrass us. His candidature,
therefore, seems to have nothing to recommend it.
9. As regards / the proposal to carve out a kingdom of Northern Mesopotamia
under Shereef Zeid, we have no evidence as to the feelings of the local Arabs, tribal
or urban, towards his person ; but the creation of a separate independent or quasi
independent kingdom would obviously be highly inconvenient. Captain Wilson has
recently been emphasising the close connection, economic and political, which exists
between the vilayets of Mosul and Baghdad. It was very unfortunate that the Sykes-
Picot Agreement assigned the former to France, and a strong endeavour is to be made to
get France out. Clearly an Arab kingdom under England would be much less incon
venient than one under France, but three serious disadvantages may be mentioned :—
(1) We do not yet know how close our control over these Arab kings ” is to be, and,
in any case, we are avowedly working for a time when it is to disappear altogether :
if Mosul were a separate kingdom there would be no sufficient guarantee of that close
and friendly co-operation which is necessary to secure the most important interests
of Baghdad and Basra (e.gr., irrigation); (2) the whole mechanism of British control
or administration would have to be duplicated ; (3) ihe Sykes-Pi cot Agreement
divided Kurdistan into three, and this undesirable partition would remain. The seat
of control would naturally lie in the Kingdom of Mosul, but the Kurds extend across
the Kingdom of Iraq. This would greatly hinder the unification and confederation
of Kurdistan, which is so important for the peace alike of Armenia and Mesopotamia.
10. It is submitted, therefore, that Colonel Lawrence’s scheme has nothing to
commend it so far as Mesopotamia and Iraq are concerned, convenient as it may be
as a means of providing for the embarrassing ambitions of King Husain’s other two
sons, when Ali has been installed at Mecca and Feisal at Damascus.
11. Captain Wilson’s telegrams 9906 and 9926 of 16th and 17th November,
were received after the first part of this Memorandum had been written. I need
hardly say that I share his apprehensions if the Anglo-French declaration means what
he thinks. In any case, those who are now responsible for Iraq are bound to protest
against any sacrifice of the interests of the Arabs of Iraq to those of the Arabs of
Syria or elsewhere. As I have already said, I cannot see that we are bound by
honour or interest to defend the Arabs against the French. That the French will
allow themselves to be eliminated from Syria by any local option under the
declaration—or that, if they do, they will allow us to take their place, as some
imagine—is surely incredible. Syria is too deeply graven on the heart of France
for that. If we support the Arabs in this matter, we incur the ill-will of France,
and we have to live and work with France all over the world. We have no interests
of our own in Syria at all commensurate with those in Mesopotamia ; and if we had,
and could eliminate the French in our own favour, could we possibly undertake the
control of Syrian politics and administration in addition to our responsibilities in
Mesopotamia and the Arabian peninsula ?
12. And if we cannot eliminate the French from Syria, neither can we weaken
their hold there without^ pro tanto, weakening our hold over Mesopotamia. But if
Mesopotamia is to be developed, our control of the administration must be complete.