Papers on British policy and the Arab movement [‎114v] (232/380)

but I submit that it is not conclusive. The material interests involved in Mesopotamia
are far too great to be jockeyed away merely for the sake ol diplomatic convenience.
W e are not pledged to Iving Husain to prevent the 1*rench from establishing a
protectorate: our pledges relate only to those areas in which we can act without
detriment to French interests, and we ought to take our stand firmly on that giound,
and not allow ourselves to be used by the Arabs to secure their interests in Syria at
the expense of the krench. That, however, is what we are doing at piesent, ami in
doing it we risk losing the fruits of the Mesopotamian campaign lor the beaux. j[eux
of King Husain and his scheming sons.
4. But it may be impossible on other grounds to put forward an avowed
British Protectorate at the Peace Conference. In that case we must work for
Sir P. Cox’s second alternative—real British control behind the facade of an Aiab
ruler, and we must have our candidate ready and take the necessaiy steps to secuie
his acceptance in Iraq. The candidate who at present holds the tield is the Ffaq.ib of
Baghdad, but at the eleventh hour Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence has come home with
a proposal to put one of the sons of King Husain in as King ol Iraq, and anothei as
King of Northern Mesopotamia with his capital at Mosul or Ras-el-Ain. Although I
am not aware that anything has occurred since the Eastern Committee accepted
Sir P. Cox’s proposal last spring to cause them to alter their decision, something must
be said about Colonel Lawrence’s proposal.
f). And in the first place, without in the least wishing to depreciate Colonel
Lawrence’s achievements and his undoubted genius, it must be said about him that
he does not at all represent—and would not, I think, claim to represent the local
views of Northern Mesopotamia and Iraq; of the latter, indeed, he has practically no
first-hand knowledge at all, and if His Majesty’s Government want to know what they
are they will naturally turn to the.Civil Commissioner and his officers.
6. As to their views there is little doubt. Sir P. Cox was asked the definite
questions : “Can any Arab authority be discovered, dynastic or representative, that
“ will command the necessary moral sanction in [Mesopotamia] as a whole ? W hat
“ weight does King Husain or his family carry with the local Arabs ? ” His answer
to the first has already been quoted—he considered that the Naqib of Baghdad and his
family possess the necessary qualifications. To the second he replied : “ King Husain
“ and his family carry no weight in Iraq, where only the most distant interest is
“ taken in him” ; and he said : “ I cannot see the least justification or necessity for
introducing one of the family ” as local potentate. The recognition- accorded to the
Sherif, writes Miss Bell, “ is of the most tenuous kind. The respect which his name
“ undoubtedly arouses is given to him as a religious luminary, the first in Islam, not
“ a s a political leader.” She points out that though “there have been individual
instances of his being regarded as the centre of Arab unity,” they have occurred not
among the better instructed town population, but among the tribes and provincial
miyids” and among Shiahs looking to a potentate who is more than suspected of
Shiah leanings. If these views are correct—and there is no reason to doubt it--it is
clear that Abdullah, who is personally unknown in Mesopotomia, would find in his
father’s prestige a very weak claim to acceptance ; and if, as appears to be the case,
Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence’s scheme further contemplates the eventual succession
to King Husain of his son Ali, whose Sunni orthodoxy is undoubted, even that
slender claim would disappear.
7. The fact is that the scheme presupposes a solidarity which does not exist,
and which we have no interest in encouraging. The outlook of east and'west Arabia
is widely different in this respect. “ When the Shaikhs of the Beni Hasan,” says
Miss Bell, “ write of uniting the Arab nation, it can be confidently affirmed that the
“ words convey no definite political conception. They are not indeed in a position
“ to form one. Their political horizon is bounded by Baghdad and Kufah ; Amarah
“ and Basra are almost outside the circle of their interest, to say nothing of Syria or
“ Morocco. But in Baghdad itself, where alone there are men who have a hearsay
“ acquaintance with the Arab world beyond Mesopotamia, there exists a deep seated
“ jealousy of Arabs who are not of local birth.” As an example she quotes their
dislike of Syrians, and adds : “ Patriotism, as can be remarked in any part of the
“ Arab provinces, is strictly local, when it leaves the realm of windy phrase-making
“ and comes to practical applications.” With this may be compared what Captain