Papers on British policy and the Arab movement [‎12r] (25/380)

quarrel between Ibn Iteshid and Bln Saud so as to promote unison of action and a
common enthusiasm for the cause of Arab freedom. Ibn Beshid might, at the outside
muster a force of 10,000 men.
It woukl appear from the statements of the Sherif that the powerful Anazeh tribes
who inhabit the interior of Syria are prepared to co-operate with him in throwing off
the lurkish yoke. °
10. By encouraging the Sherif to rebel against the Turks, by supplying him with
arms and money, by guaranteeing Arab independence, and by promising to aid the
future Arab state against foreign aggression, Great Britain has undoubtedly assumed
serious military responsibilities. It is true that we have avoided giving to the Sherif
any promise of direct co-operation, and that therefore we would not technically be
guilty of any breach of faith by adopting an inactive attitude in the Sinai Peninsula.
It cannot, however, be doubted that in the eyes of Islam we would be held morally
responsible if \ve deserted the Sherif after inciting him to try conclusions with the
Turks, and after proclaiming Arab freedom, and that at our door would be laid the
responsibility of the desecration of the Holy places that would inevitably follow the
defeat of the Sherif, and the reconquest of Mecca by the Turks. The result of this
feeling might be far-reaching throughout our Moslem possessions, and would be exploited
to the full by Germany. r
The Arabs may not perhaps count on any large British operations being under
taken, much as they would appreciate an expedition into Syria, but they ^vill not
understand total inaction. -They will look for co-operation in a minor degree, and also
to be supplied with war material. The fact that Great Britain has studiously avoided
any definite agreement for joint military action will count for little should their efforts
not meet with success.
. . U- 0win g to the difficulty of estimating the religious effect of the Sherifs risincr
it is not easy to forecast the action of the Turkish Government, but it is certain that
they will regard it with considerable anxiety. Were it not for the fact that Turkish
operations are now controlled by the German General Staff, it is not improbable that
lurkish reinforcements would be hurried to the south with a view to re-establish the
Sultan s authority in the Hejaz, and to deal drastically with the Sherif s adherents.
It is, however, unlikely that the German General Staff will allow any sentimental
considerations connected with the Hejaz movements to upset their strategical distribution
of the lurkish Army in the various theatres in which it is engaged. At the same time
the possibility of the detachment of considerable forces to this theatre cannot wholly
be excluded. J
12. For some months past the Turks have foreseen the danger that mio-ht arise
from the existence of large Arab units in their armies, and since October, 1914, such
formations have been gradually eliminated. Two Arab divisions have definitely ceased
to exist as such, whilst a third Arab division has not figured in any fightino- since the
evacuation of Gallipoli. It is therefore improbable that the Arab revolt will have any
far-reaching influence on the Turkish Army. That Army now consists of 50 so-called
divisions, of which 4 are in Arabia, viz. :—2 in Southern Yemen, 1 in Asir, and 1 in
the Hejaz. 25 divisions are in Armenia, 6 in Mesopotamia and on the Persian frontier,
J m Palestine and Syria, and 12 in European Turkey, Smyrna (4) and parts of Asia
Minor where no hostilities are in progress.
\?\ i he fi rst action of the Turks will probably to be attempt to concentrate the
two divisions in Yemen, amounting to about 6,000 men with 40 field ^uns with
the division in Asir whose strength may be taken at 3,000 men with 8 field guns
I he possibility of their so doing will depend firstly on whether the British exert any
pressure on them from Aden, and secondly on the attitude of the Idrissi and Imam.
Jf the concentration is effected, the Turks may then decide either to march the divisions
into the Hejaz to attack the Sherif, or to bring them away altogether before it is too
late, the decision being guided by the extent of their ammunition supply, the state of
tieii transport, and the condition of the roads, of all of which no precise details are
available. In the latter case they might be marched vid Ibha, Bisheh, Arf and Hail to
2s ejel cn the Euphrates, if difficulties of transport and supply proved to be not insupera-
bie. . If, on the other hand it were decided to attack the Sherif in the Hejaz the three
divisions in question could combine with the remains of the 22nd Division already in the
Hejaz, and with any reinforcements that might be brought down the Medina Railway
Without materially interfering with the strategical distribution of the Turkish armies
two di\ ismns might be made immediately available from Smyrna and one from the
Aleppo Alexandretta area, and by assuming a defensive attitude in Armenia five more
divisions could eventually be brought up from about Sivas. Thus it would be possible
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