Papers on British policy and the Arab movement [‎11v] (24/380)

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Government, as to the future boundaries of the prospective Arab state and the
delimitation of the respective French and British spheres of influence. These negotia
tions involved the settlement of many difficult questions, but were finally brought to a
definite conclusion as between Great Britain and France. The attitude of Russia had
then to be taken into account, and Sir M. Sykes and M. Picot proceeded to Petrograd, ^
where an agreement was arrived at with M. Sazonoffin March, 1916. The accompanying
map shows the decisions which were ultimately reached.
6. Meanwhile correspondence had been passing between the Sherif and the High
Commissioner, and in Appendix A will be found the more important points which have
or have not been agreed to by the contracting parties. Eventually the Sherif pledged
himself to take action towards expelling the Turks from the Arab area, and asked for
British assistance in the shape of arms, ammunition and money. These have been given,
and on the 5th June the Arabs rose in Medina, thus commencinjT the revolt.
7. Having thus dealt with the history of the movement, it is necessary to consider
the position and resources of the chief actors in the drama. The Sherif of Mecca
exercises sway over the greater part of north-western Arabia and, in addition, exerts a
wider influence outside his own particular district than any other Arab potentate. He
commands a certain spiritual consideration throughout the whole of Islam, and his
family is both the most enlightened of all the Arab ruling houses, and possesses the
greatest resources of various kinds. He has always represented himself, in his
correspondence with the High Commissioner, as being the spokesman of the Arab
nation, but so far as is known, he is not supported by any organization of Arabs nearly
general enough to secure, even throughout the larger part of the Arab area, the
automatic acceptance of the terms agreed to by him. It would, therefore, be futile to
treat with him alone and to assume that through him all Arabs could be influenced and
bound.
8. In March, 1916, the Sherif estimated that he could raise a force of 250,000 men,
but, although it is possible that such a number might temporarily respond to his orders,
difficulties of supply, lack of discipline and the want of cohesion inherent in the Arab
race would certainly prevent the concentration and maintenance of even a tithe of that
number in any one locality. There is no information as to the stock of arms and
ammunition in the Sherif s possession, but his demands for a small number of rifles have
been so insistent that it may be assumed that he possesses but few. As, however, he
must have been well aware of the strength of the Turkish forces in the Hejaz, it seems
reasonable to assume that before revolting he considered his resources sufficient to
overcome them. It is important to obtain from the Sherif some idea of the amount of
arms and ammunition at his disposal, as without this information no proper estimate
can be formed of the assistance he may require.
9. The other Arab chiefs of whom account may be taken are Bin Saud, Emir of
Nejd (see small map attached); the Idrissi, ruler of Asir; the Imam of Yemen;
Ibn Reshid, Emir of Hail; and the chiefs of the Anazeh tribes.
Bin Saud has been recognized by Great Britain as independent ruler of Nejd,
El Qatif, and Hasa, and, by a treaty recently negotiated by Sir Percy Cox, we have
undertaken to aid him against unprovoked aggression by any foreign Power, provided
he observes certain conditions as to his dealings with other nations. It is therefore
necessary that he should be carried with us in any settlement of Arabian affairs. His
relations with the Sherif are now friendly, but he has consistently opposed Ibn Reshid,
with whom he was at war until the summer of 1915. His forces probably'amount to
about 10,000 armed men.
The Idrissi has, thanks to Italian gold, preserved a loyal attitude towards this
country, and has been supplied with a certain quantity of arms and ammunition. The
Indian Government are at present negotiating a treaty with him by which he will
secure autonomy and security from maritime attack. He has been more or less in a
state of active revolt against the Turks since 1892.
The Imam, who is a rival of the Idrissi, has, on the other hand, definitely thrown
in his lot with the Turks, and, although the Resident of Aden has called upon him to
join with the Sherif, it would seem unlikely that he will take any steps to interfere with
the Turkish troops in his district. He could assemble a large force, and has guns and
ammunition of his own.
The relations of Ibn Reshid with the Sherif are normally friendly, but he is openly
hostile to the British, and his recont approach to Basra with an armed following gave
rise to certain misgivings. He has a hereditary feud with Bin Saud, and the difficulties
of persuading him to co-operate with the other Arab leaders against the Turks would
be considerable. One of the objects of British diplomacy should be to patch up the