File 87/1926 Pt 2 'Arabia: Bin Saud: Relations with H.M.G. Revision of Treaty.' [‎519r] (725/840)

announcement of the points regarded by His Majesty’s Government
as fixed was unwelcome to I bn Sa‘ud ; and when I informed him that
His Majesty’s Government were now of opinion that Kaf should be
included in Trans-Jordan, he was visibly, and I believe genuinely,
perturbed. He expressed himself as being unable to accept this
change, ?ind he also objected vehemently to the northern frontier being
so drawn as to unite Trans-Jordan and ‘Iraq and thus separate Nejd
from Syria.
Ibn Sa'ud’s Objections.
8. In support of this twofold contention, Ibn Sa'ud advanced
numerous and diverse arguments which will be found in the record of
proceedings (Annexure 2, summary of first four meetings) and in the
three unsigned memoranda which he presented after the first, second
and fourth meetings respectively (Annexure 4). I will content myself
here with a reference to the main arguments of his thesis. With
regard to Kaf, his principal contention was that His Majesty’s
Government had, on the 23rd October, 1924, through the Political
Agent at Bahrain, formally offered him a frontier which gave Kaf
and a section of the four Wadis to Nejd ; and that, since he had
published the contents of that letter broadcast among his tribes and
pledged his word to its effect, he had so committed himself as to be
unable to recede from that position. He emphasized the fact that
his authority in Nejd rested entirely on his personal ascendancy over
his subjects, and that the reversal of a decision which he had pub
lished as final would mean a greater risk to his prestige than he was
prepared to run. With regard to the northern frontier, he main
tained that the territories of w^hich he was now master had always
marcfied with those of Syria ; and that in view of this historical fact
and of the long-established traffic between Damascus and Central
Arabia he could not see his way to accepting any kind of barrier
between his dominions and the Syrian border.
9. Although my instructions authorised me explicitly to cede Kaf
in the last resort, I did not think it advisable to do so until the last
possible moment, and I adhered to my original position throughout
the first four meetings. In the first place, I wished to test the
genuineness of Ibn Sa‘ud’s professions and gauge the length to which
he was prepared to carry resistance. In the second place, I con
sidered it essential to withhold any cession of Kaf until he and his
advisers were in such a frame of mind as to consider it a concession
which placed them under the obligation of furnishing adequate
guarantees in return. I therefore suggested to Ibn Sa‘ud at the
close of the fourth meeting that, as we had apparently reached a
deadlock in regard to the question of Kaf, we should proceed to
discuss the questions concerning ‘Iraq. Ibn Sa'ud assented thls
proposal, and as soon as agreement in principle had been reached on
those questions (seventh meeting), I re-opened negotiations on Trans
jordan affairs, still maintaining my original position without, how
ever, carrying matters to the length of a rupture.
Final Offer to Ibn Sa'ud.
10 Eventually, at the opening of the tenth meeting, I presented
Ibn Sa'ud with the text of a draft Agreement concerning Trans
jordan (Annexure 5). I had come to the conclusion that no form of
persuasion would induce Ibn Sa'ud voluntarily to give up Kaf and
that arbitrary dictation, even if successful in securing the desired