Typescript and printed cabinet papers and parliamentary papers on events in Egypt [‎98v] (196/520)

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inacceptables pour nous, dispositions qui n’assurent pas & 1’Egypte
1’exercice de son droit incontestable de souverainet^ sur cette
contr^e et de controle sur les eaux du Nil.
Les observations qui precedent nous dispensent de faire 1’analyse
du projet. Elies en font suffisamment ressortir 1’esprit et la portae.
Et 1’insistance avec laquelle le projet revient sur les obligations de
la Grande-Bretagne, “les responsabilites sp^ciales ” du Haut-
Commissaire et le nouvel objectif—sauvegarde des int^rets vitaux
de 1’Egypte—donne k la presence de la force militaire achbve de lui
imprimer le caractere d’une veritable tutelle.
En acceptant la mission que Sa Hautesse le Sultan nous a
confine, nous avions I’espoir de conclure un traite d’alliance, qui,
tout en consacrant reellement I’independance de 1’Egypte, aurait
sauvegard^ les interets britanniques, et I’Egypte alli^e de la Grande-
Bretagne aurait tenu a honneur de remplir scrupuleusement les
obligations qui lui eussent incomb^. Mais I’alliance entre deux
peuples n’est realisable qu’a la condition de ne pas constituer pour
Fun d’eux un pacte perpetuel de soumission.
L’esprit de conciliation qui a preside a nos discussions nous
autorisait k envisager le resultat des negociations avec confiance. Le
projet que nous avons entre les mains ne repond pas a cette attente.
Tel qu’il se presente, il ne nous permet pas de conserver I’espoir
d’arriver a un accord donnant satisfaction aux aspirations nationales
de 1’Egypte.
Londres, le 15 novnnbre 1921.
(Translation.)
The Egyptian Official Delegation have taken cognizance of the
draft handed to their President by Lord Curzon on the 10th instant.
The Delegation note that with regard to the majority of the
questions which have formed the subject of our discussions and of
notes exchanged between us during a period of four months, the
draft reproduces the texts and the formulae which were presented to
us at the beginning of the negotiations and which we did not accept.
Thus with regard to the military question, which is one of capital
importance, the draft not only supports, but even extends the scope
of, the solution which we so resolutely opposed. The protection
of Imperial communications, which in the conversations of last year
was given as the only reason for the presence of a military force in
Egypt, could not justify this solution.
While it would have been sufficient to agree upon a zone
in the region of the Canal, where the ways and means of
Imperial communications and the force for their protection might
have been localised, the draft confers on Great Britain the right to
maintain military forces at all times, on an}- part of Egyptian territory,
and places at her disposition all the ways and means of communica
tion in the country. This constitutes occupation pure and simple,
destroys every idea of independence and suppresses even internal
sovereignty. In the past military occupation, although it had only a
temporary character, sufficed to guarantee to Great Britain absolute
control over the whole administration without the need of any textual
treaty or any definition of powers whatever.