File of printed papers marked 'Egyptian negotiation' between Curzon and Adly Pasha and the Egyptian delegation [‎17v] (34/178)

Their view was that, satisfied with the position acquired ^
the Treaty, the Egyptians would be the last to favour mtngucs, which might give
other foreign nations an opportunity of interfering m their coun ry Y ' could
mischief between them and Great Britain. Ihe greatest sa eguar would be
have against such machinations was the fact that the Egyptians ei s status
whole-heartedly in favour of an Alliance which fully recognised their national status
aDd Suchwere the arguments which led us to reconsider our position on the question
of diplomatic status. In so doing we were well aware, and we frankly told the aeie
gates, that this was a concession which might alarm public opinion in tins LOU J
and imperil the acceptance of the agreement as a whole by the British people. A ,
fudging from the unfavourable comments which this proposal has already exc
in many quarters, it is evident that we were not mistaken in anticipating tha i
would meet with serious opposition. Nevertheless, we remain ot opinion that tne
balance of argument is decisively in its favour. So long as bitterness and tnc ion
continue to exist between Great Britain and Egypt, we shall always be exposed to the
hostility of Egyptians in foreign countries. Associations for the purpose of an i-
British propaganda have been actively at work for a number of years m Switzerland,
France, Germany and Italy. There is no remedy for this, except in restoring frlel jdly
relations and we rely cn the whole policy here proposed to have this effect. il_f| ia
result is achieved there will, in our opinion, be positive advantages in gmng
diplomatic status to Egyptian representatives abroad. For it, as is only to he
expected, a certain number of irreccncilables are still left to carry on the campaign
against Great Britain, the official representatives of Egypt will be bound to try
to restrain them. No Egyptian Minister could do otherwise than discountenance
activities on the part of his own countrymen, directed against Egypt s ally, without
failing in his duty and rendering himself liable to be recalled.
'2. The Defence of Tmferial Communications.
The supreme importance which the delegates attached to the question ofnational
status was once more strongly in evidence when we came to deal with Great Britain s
strategic interest in Egypt—the protection of her Imperial communications, io
Great Britain—as an ally—they thought that Egypt could, without indignity, accord
a base in Egyptian territory, “ a strong place of arms,’ a foint d affmm the chain
of her Imperial defences, linking East and West. They were not averse from the idea
that Great Britain, in case of war, should have the command of Egyptian resources,
and especially of all means of communication, railways, aerodromes, &c., for the
conduct of military operations. Such a stipulation was even welcome as emphasising
the “ bilateral ” character of the agreement between the two countries, inasmuch as
Egypt would be giving something in exchange for what she got. As by a Freaty of
Alliance Great Britain would be undertaking to defend Egypt, it was only fair that
Egypt should do something to assist the British Empire, if Great Britain was engaged
in a war, even a war in which Egypt was not directly interested.
A more difficult point was the maintenance of a British military force m Egypt
in time of peace. But here again it was not so much the numbers of the force in
question which interested the Egyptians as its character. As long as it was not there
as an “ Army of Occupation,” as a force intended to “ keep order ” m Egypt, which
was merely another way ot saying to keep Egypt in subjection, but was maintained
for cin external ob]oct, the deten.ee of the British Bmpne, the piesence of a Biitish
force in Egypt was justifiable from their point of view. The question of the strength
of that force was never raised in the course of the discussion. It was recognised that
this depended on external conditions and, apart from what would be necessary if
Eo-vpt was herself in danger, might vary with the varying exigencies of Imperial
del 1 ence. The great point was, that it should not be regarded in any sense as a
garrison of Egypt. The maintenance of internal order was a matter for the
Egyptians themselves. , 1 .
In order to emphasise this aspect of the case the delegates urged very strongly,
that the force in question should be stationed on the bank of the Suez Canal and
preferably on its eastern side. But to this it was quite impossible for us to agree.
For in the first place, the presence of British troops in the neutral ‘ ‘ canal zone ’ ’
would be calculated to raise trouble with other Powers interested in that international
waterway. The neutrality of the canal is guaranteed by international agreements
and the"permanent occupation of the canal zone by troops of any single Power might
be challenged as a breach of that neutrality. Moreover, Great Britain’s strategic