Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎136r] (271/348)

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[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty’s Government.]
V
EASTERN (Turkey). [May 10.]
CONFIDENTIAL. Section 1.
[ E 4853/5/44] No. 1.
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).
(No. 1405.)
My Lord, Foreign Office, May 10, 1922.
IT is now six weeks since the conference between the Foreign Ministers of
France, Italy, and Great Britain separated at Paris after agreeing upon a number of
dehnite proposals for the termination of hostilities between the Greeks and the Turks,
for the final conclusion of peace between the Allied Powers and Turkey, and for the
settlement of the most important aspects of the Near Eastern question. These
proposals, which it is unnecessary to recapitulate here, were communicated by
telegram to the Governments concerned and an early reply was requested. The
Greek Government immediately accepted the first suggestion of the Powers, viz. the
conclusion of the armistice. No further reply from them has been received. In the
case of the Turkish answer the situation has been complicated by the facts (1) that
there are two Turkish Governments in existence whose replies had to be received :
(2) that the replies, though nominally distinct, were compelled by the force of
circumstances to be more or less interdependent, the Constantinople Government not
being likely or willing to return any answer which would not be in general consonance
with the views entertained at Angora : (3) that each of these two Governments, in
true Oriental fashion, welcomed the opportunity either to dispute about the precise
meaning of the terms submitted to them, or to reopen the entire discussion which it
was the object of the proposals to close, or to manoeuvre for position in rhe Conference
which had been suggested. It is not necessary for the purposes of the present
argument to analyse with any closeness the replies of the Constantinople Government
since, as M. Poincare has remarked, they do not differ sensibly from that of the
Angora Turks.
The reply of the latter has assumed a double form. Its first edition was
contained in the note of the 5th April in which the Angora Government advanced the
claim inter alia that evacuation of Asia Minor by the Greek troops must be proceeded
with as soon as an Armistice had been concluded, and in particular that the evacua
tion of the advanced strategic position held by the Greeks upon the railway
Eskishehr-Afiun Karahissar must be effected within fifteen days—no regard /;
whatever being paid to the fundamental considerations which undei4+# the proposal
of the Powers, viz. that the Armistice had been proposed in order to allow for the
discussion of peace preliminaries; that evacuation could only begin after the expira
tion of the Armistice; and that evacuation was only one, although doubtless the most
important, of the conditions upon which the Allied" Foreign Ministers had agreed, at
Paris, for the settlement of the entire problem.
A reply to these pretensions drafted by the French Government was accepted
without demur by the British and Italian Governments, in which the three Powers,
in their anxiety for conciliation, expressed their willingness to agree to evacuation
as soon as the body of the peace conditions proposed by them had been accepted.
The second and more detailed reply of the Angora Government was contained in
a note dated the 22nd April, which was even more obviously intended for purposes
both of propaganda and procrastination. In this reply, the Angora Authorities
entered into a long and partisan disquisition about massacres in Asia Minor;
definitely rejected the idea of evacuation subject to the acceptance of the ensemble
of the peace conditions; insisted on the commencement of evacuation simultaneously
with the acceptance of an Armistice; demanded to know what precisely were the
special points which had been reserved for discussion outside the aforementioned
ensemble ; and ended by saying that Angora delegates would be ready to meet plenipo
tentiaries of the Allied Pow'ers at Ismid for preliminary negotiations—the informa
tion being subsequently added that Mustapha Kemal would be willing to attend such
a Conference in person, and that it was desirable for the Allied plenipotentiaries to
have full powers to take decisions without reference to their Governments. This
communication appeared to FTis Majesty’s Government to raise three questions :
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