Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎128v] (256/348)

Italian Ministry, whenever constituted, it they thought that postponement tor two
weeks, or three weeks—to the end of March, for instance—was necessary, we should
be quite prepared, as no doubt would be the French, to consider their views. But I
did not think that the British Cabinet would favour a proposal for any longer or
indefinite extension of time.
As regards the main question which I put, the Count de Saint-Aulaire said
that my first interpretation of the note was unquestionably the right one, and that
the French Government had no desire, by inventing obstacles, to retard indefinitely,
much less to defeat, the conference to which all had agreed.
In that case, I replied, it seemed to me that the sooner the points about which
the French Government had doubts, or were in apprehension, could be removed, the
better, and 1 felt sure that if the French Government were disposed to send over
their experts to London to examine the matter with our own, we should be delighted
to receive them. A committee had, I said, been sitting here to report upon the work
in the economic sphere that would lie before the conference, and its members would,
I felt sure, be prepared to join without delay in conversations with colleagues from
France, if the latter were disposed to come over.
When the Ambassador asked me how soon such discussions might take place, I
replied as soon as he liked, and as soon as the French delegates found it convenient
to attend. I further informed the Ambassador that the Prime Minister had just
delivered an answer in the House of Commons to a question put by Commander
Kenworthy with regard to the conditions under which the Soviet delegation was
likely to attend at Genoa. The Prime Minister had just informed me that he had
stated in his reply that he regarded the acceptance of the invitation by the Soviet
Government as an acceptance of the conditions which had been laid down at Cannes
for their attendance, and I suggested to his Excellency that he should read the terms
of the answer in the newspapers to-morrow morning.
Passing to the question of the Near East, the Ambassador asked me if I was
satisfied with the note which I had received from M. Poincare himself in reply to
the despatch which I had written to Paris.
I replied that I gladly recognised its courteous and conciliatory character, and
that it rendered me more hopeful of the impending conference than I had previously
felt inclined to be.
The Ambassador added that the necessity of finding real and substanial
guarantees for the protection of the minorities in Turkish territory was fully
recognised by the French, and that difficult as might be the task they would lend us
every support in endeavouring to secure them. They would also be quite willing to
discuss in Paris the various steps that might be possible for putting pressure upon
the Turks, always premising that the French could not be called upon to put tioops
into the field against them—a condition which, he believed, equally applied to our
selves. Any other forms of sanction they were anxious to discuss in a favourable
spirit.
Without pursuing the question now, I said it was a question which we were
still engaged in studying, and that 1 had hoped at a later date to have some proposals
to make.
His Excellency then passed to the question of the proposed Anglo-French Treaty,
and asked whether His Majesty’s Government was yet in a position to reply to the
full note which M. Poincare had recently sent in.
I said that though I had not yet had time to go into this in detail with the
Cabinet, as I hoped in a day or two to do, I was in a position, after the last two days’
debate in both Houses of Parliament, to state even more clearly and frankly to the
French Ambassador what the attitude, not merely of the British Government but
of public opinion in England, upon the question was likely to be. If his Excellency
had looked at the papers he would have seen that while no speaker had expressed
any feelings but those of the warmest respect and regard for France and of the
necessity tor continuing the friendship and close understanding between the two
nations, there were definite and not negligible sections of opinion who had not merely
objected to any extension of the draft proposal of 1918, but had actually protested
against any guarantee being given at all. Among the latter class was no less a person
than Lord Robert Cecil. The Ambassador would, therefore, be able to appreciate
the different currents of thought in this country, and would realise the impossibility
for the Government to go beyond that in which they would be supported by public
opinion in granting. In fact, I said, 1 must tell his Excellency quite frankly that
I did not think the Cabinet would be moved to go in substance at all outside the