Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎128r] (255/348)

CIRCULATED TO TH~ CABINET.
[This Document is thfl Property of His Britannic Majesty s Government.]
No. 1.—SECRETARY OF STATE.
CENT UAL EUROPE.
[February 9.J
CONFIDENTIAL.
Section 1.
[C 2000/458/62] No. 1.
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).
(No. 405.)
Mv Lord. Foreign Office, February 9, 1922.
THE French Ambassador called upon me this afternoon, and in the course of our
conversation touched upon three questions which are under discussion between our
two Governments, namely, the Genoa Conference, the Near Eastern Conterence and
the proposed Anglo-French Guarantee. I will record in turn what passed between us
upon each of these subjects.
Firstly, as to the Genoa Conference, his Excellency asked me whether the Cabinet
had yet had time to consider the note from the French Government which the trench
Charge d’Affaires had presented to the Foreign Office on the 6th February.
1 was obliged to tell him that owing to the pressure of work arising out of the
opening of Parliament, neither in this case nor in that of the so-called Pact had
the Cabinet yet found time to arrive at a final decision. I was, however, quite
prepared to make certain preliminary observations to him about each.
Concerning the Genoa Conference, I asked at once whether I was right in
believing that the French Government intended to be represented.
The Count de Saint-Aulaire answered this question unhesitatingly in the
affirmative, stating that the French Government held themselves absolutely bound by
the decisions arrived at at Cannes with the consent of the late h rench Premier,
although he did not conceal from me that M. Briand s successor held somewhat
different views on the matter from those which had been entertained by M. Briand
himself. The Ambassador further added that as the French Government had
decided to take part it was indispensable in the interests of our own two countries
in particular, and of Europe in general, that the conference should not be a failure.
Such a result would be an immeasurable disaster to Europe. Any steps that could
be taken to prevent such a calamity ought, therefore, to be taken in advance, whether
by due preparation, investigation or otherwise.
Accepting these propositions, I went on to say that M. Poincare’s note seemed
to me to admit of two possible interpretations, and the way in which it should be met
must depend entirely on the question which of the two was right. For instance, the
note might be regarded as containing a number of perfectly legitimate questions put
by the French Government in order to remove obstacles or elucidate doubts. As such,
it would deserve the fullest consideration, which we should be glad to give to it. On
the other hand, it might be thought—and had indeed been suggested in some quarters
—that by raising the number of points which were contained in the note the French
Government was adopting—whether consciously or unconsciously—the best method
for postponing the meeting of the conference, and perhaps even preventing it from
being held. Furthermore, the latter point of view might find some justification in
the suggestion, with which the note had ended, that the Genoa Conference should be
postponed for at least three months.
As to this suggestion, I told the Ambassador quite frankly that I did not conceive
that it would be entertainecl for a moment, either by my Government or by the Italian
Government, who had issued the invitations. Nor could I see why the preliminary
examination which the French had suggested should involve so protracted a delay.
Indeed, postponement for three months, with the great issues at stake and with the
present unsettled position of affairs, would certainly be regarded in some quarters as
postponement sine die, and might end in the complete disappearance of the project.
As a matter of fact, the date of the meeting did not rest either with the French
Government or with ourselves. It rested with the Italian Government, who were the
conveners of the meeting. So far as my information went, they had not even, in
spite of the fall of Signor Bonomi’s Ministry, expressed any desire to make a change,
and I felt sure that the new Government, whoever might be its head, would feel
disposed in this respect to adhere to the plans of its predecessor. On the other hand,
a delay in forming a Government might, if much further protracted, render some
slight postponement necessary. For that we must await the initiative of the new
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