Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎103v] (206/348)

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want of unanimity. The kind of agreement which J had in view must, I thought,
cover the following points :—
1 . Smyrna.
2. Asia Minor in general.
3. Constantinople.
4. Straits.
5. Financial provisions.
(j. Thrace.
The Ambassador asked me if I thought that an inter-Allied agreement on these
points was possible. u
I answered that, provided goodwill was shown, I did not see any reason to the
contrary, and that I thought it quite possible to formulate proposals as a basis ioi
discussions which might lead to an agreement on all these points.
His Fxcellency expressed his most cordial concurrence with my mode ot procedure,
which entirely coincided with his own views and, he believed, with those ol Ins own
Government, and he asked whether the discussion which I had suggested was meant
by me to mean a meeting of the Supreme Council or a more private and friendly
conference of the representatives of the three Great Powers.
I replied, unhesitatingly, the latter. 1 doubted if this matter would ever be
settled at a meeting of the Supreme Council, with all the attendant disadvantages an
publicity. 1 thought that the best way to settle the matter would be for the foreign
Ministers of the three Powers to meet together—much on the same ^ llle ^ as the meeting
in Paris last June—to thrash out, point by point, the various subjects that 1 had raised,
and not to separate until they had arrived at an agreement upon all of them. When
this had been done, it would then be possible to summon the belligerent parties to a
conference, but, I thought, upon this condition—that the terms which had been agreed
upon would have to be laid down and enforced. I did not suggest that all discussion
would be ruled out, but, broadly speaking, the Powers could not afford to place
themselves again in the position which had arisen in^London in March last; and they
would have to state their terms not merely as those upon which they had agreed, but
as terms which they were prepared to enforce, and the responsibility loi rejecting
which, with all its serious consequences, would lie upon the party or parties which
might refuse them. _ . . .
Count de Saint-Aulaire recognised the justice of these views, winch he thought
corresponded exactly to the requirements of the case.
He then passed on to say something about the speech which 1 had delivered a few
days ago in the Citv of London, and which had excited a ceitain amount of attention
in his country.
He told me he had personally or officially no complaint to make about this
speech ; but there were passages in it, as reported to Paris, which seemed to call loi
some elucidation. .
I said that, although I was not in the habit of preparing the text of my speeches,
there was nothing in my observations, as recorded in the Daily lelegiaph, which
seemed to me the most accurate report, which did not faithfully represent my views,
and, as I believed, those of my colleagues, or which 1 was prepared to withdraw.
His Excellency hastily assured me that he contemplated no such suggestion, ami
that he himself had realised when he had read the speech in full that it was far Ironi
bearing the interpretation which had been attached to it by the quotation of certain
passages detached from their context, which had been sent on the vires to Paris.
There was one point, however, in which he did not clearly follow my argument.
What was the meaning of my observation about disarmament ? .wnd what was the
correlation betw r een naval disarmament and military disarmament ? He did not
himself see the connection between the two, and thought that his countrymen shared
his view.
I replied that if he would look at the passage to which he referred he would hud
that I had made no specific reference to France at all, and that my remarks were of a
general character ; but that if France chose to fit the cap on her own head, the
responsibilitv must lie on her own shoulders.
T further said that from the point of view of my country I considerec) that there
was the closest connection between the two factors, to wdiich I had referred, and I
explained it in this way : —
In response to the invitation which had been issued by the American Secretary of
State, the British Government had at once and unhesitatingly agreed to a very large