Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎103r] (205/348)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty s Government.]
EASTERN.
CONFIDENTIAL.
[December 1.]
Section 1.
[E 13252/143/44] No. 1.
The Marquess Curzon of Kedleston to Lord Hardinge (Paris).
My Lord, ^ Foreign Office, December 1, 1921.
THE French Ambassador called upon me at his own desire this afternoon upon
Ins return from Fiance. He explained that he was returning in a few days in order
to see M. Briand, and wanted to be familiar with the latest aspect of the situation
before speaking to his own chief.
He began by a reference to the note which I had recently sent to the French
Government in reply to their defence of the Angora Agreement. Speaking for himself,
and in an unofficial capacity, he told me that he thought this note was irreproachable—
“ parfait ” was the word he used ; that its tone and manner were exemplary and,
moreover, that the juridical position which I had taken up in it was sound. But he
begged me not to regard this as an official expression of opinion or to make official
use of it in my communications with Paris.
I thanked him for his compliments, which were evidently intended to smooth
away the disagreeable impression which the attitude of his Government had produced,
but said no more on that point, . .
He then asked me whether it was true that the later communications with
M. Gounaris had involved any serious modification of or departure from the position
which he had taken up in his earlier interviews with me, reports of which he had seen
in Paris. . . . .
I told him that the Greek Ministers had given me categorical assurances on this
point; that the memorandum which they had submitted, and which I believed that I
had already passed on to Paris, contained an expression of the Greek point of view,
which they were quite entitled to put,forward, but they had assured me that it implied
no qualification of their previous declaration that they were prepared, in the event of a
conference, to place their case in the bands of the Powers.
The Ambassador then went on to ask me what was my view of the course of
procedure that should now be followed.
I replied that he was aware of my official despatches; that in my view the sole
condition of re-establishing peace in the Near and Middle East was the absolute and
unquestioning and unqualified agreement of the three Great Powers, France, Italy
and ourselves, and that, unless that were attained, I saw no chance of escaping from
the tan ole in which we had all become involved. I said he would have noticed that,
in the concluding words of my last note to the French Government, I had contemplated
addressing to them a further communication. In this communication I had proposed,
on behalf of the British Government, to suggest the summoning of a conference—the
locality of which would be determined hereafter—to which the Great Powers would
again ‘summon Turkey and Greece, with a view to putting before them the terms of
the final settlement. But T realised the dangers of summoning such a conference
unless certain prior conditions were fulfilled. A conference summoned without
them might fail in one of several ways; either the Angola Turks might decline
to come, or they might lay down impossible conditions before they came, or, having
come, they might break up the conference by insisting upon such conditions in
the early stages. Any one of these situations would result in an abortive conr
ference and a rebuff to the Powers. It was, therefore, in my view, an essential
preliminary condition that the Powers themselves - by which I meant France,
Italy amf Great Britain—should come to a firm and absolute agreement as to
the course which they would pursue before such a conference were convened. No
such agreement had hitherto been attained. When I was in Paris last dune the
Italian Government had only been represented by their Ambassadoi theie, and, in the
absence of his Foreign Minister, he could not pledge his Government. We had arrived
at a certain amount of agreement about Smyrna, but when we came to 1 brace we had
not been able to attain a similar accord. The agreement that was now indispensable
must cover the whole ground, and must not admit either of evasion or of doubt. It
would be fatal to summon a conference and then bring about its failure by our own
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