Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎68r] (135/348)

CIRCULATED TO THE CABINE .
[Tkifl Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty s Go¥ernmant. j
EASTERN.
[February 12 .j
CONFIDENTIAL.
Section 1.
[C 3148/2754/22] No. 1.
Harl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome).
(No. 154.)
Foreign Office, February 12, 1921.
THE Italian Ambassador asked to see me this afternoon, in order to communicate
to me the tenour of the conversation which Count Sforza had held at Paris with the
Prime Minister, and to supplement it with some further observations. He had had
instructions in this sense at Paris, but had been unable to act upon them owing to my
departure immediately after the break-up of the Conference.
What Count Sforza had proposed and held in view was a revival of the under
standing bet veen Italy and Great Britain which had, in his opinion, been the decisive
factor in the Mediterranean situation before the war. Negotiations had, he said, taken
place between the two Governments in 1912-13 with a view to putting this under
standing on a definite basis, and the Ambassador thought therefore that there ought
to be no difficulty in returning to the point at which they had been suspended.
I pointed out to Signor de Martino that, while I knew nothing of the pourparlers to
which he referred, the European situation had entirely changed in the last seven years,
that there was a different orientation of the Mediterranean States and peoples, and
that the solutions or understandings of 1913 might not be equally applicable to 1921,
and I asked him exactly what the new policy or resuscitated old policy was to be.
As to this he was becomingly vague, but when 1 hinted to him that what Count Sforza
had in view was probably a pro-Turk and anti-Greek policy to be jointly pursued by
the two Powers, he did not dissent, but rather indicated that Italian support in other
matters might be easily purchased by an accommodating attitude in this. While
reciprocating the friendly intentions of Count Sforza, 1 told the Ambassador that it
was quite impossible for either of us to ignore the position which Greece had won in
the Mediterranean as the result of the war, and I said that I thought we had better
await the results of the impending London Conference before we made any fresh
dispositions. Much the best policy for the moment seemed to me to be to get the
Treaty of Sevres ratified, subject to such modifications as might be agreed upon, and
then to determine the Mediterranean relations of the future.
Knowing from long experience that an interview with an Italian representative
cannot take place without eventuating in some petition, appeal or request, I felt no
surprise when the Ambassador, after repeating the familiar, but eminently disputable,
complaint that Italy alone of the Allies had got nothing out of the war, proceeded to
formulate a definite demand. This was that the tripartite Agreement should be
definitely incorporated in the revised treaty.
His Excellency arrived at this end by an ingenious line of approach. He reminded
me that the Italian Government had made certain reserves at San Remo abouc the
British mandates for Mesopotamia and Palestine. In their present mood of complaisance
they were willing not to persist in these reservations, but thought it very desirable
that the question of mandates should not be decided until after the London Conference
had completed its labours.
Never having regarded the Italian reservations as possessing any but a tactical
raison d'etre (and that of the slightest), I displayed no emotion on hearing of the
proffered withdrawal, but pointed out that the matter was no longer in our hands, but
in that of the Council of the League of Nations. They had fixed the date of meeting,
not we. We had no intention of asking for its further postponement. On the contrary,
if we could we should hurry it on, in order to regularise our mandatory position. But
even if there was to be further delay it could make no difference to us, since we were
already exercising mandatory powers in anticipation of sanction, and must continue to
do so. What the Ambassador really wanted, of course, was to be sure of the Tripartite
Agreement for Italy before agreeing to the mandates for Great Britain.
As regar Is the Tripartite Agreement, of the exact form of which I had been the
author in London a year ago, I pointed out to his Excellency what he did not appear to
know, namely, that it had been deliberately decided not to include it in the treaty
because ( 1 ) of the criticism that it would be sure to excite and ( 2 ) of the difficulty in
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