Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎67v] (134/348)

proceeding and before King Hussein had consolidated his authonty, was nov\ 0
unreasonable and excessive. Moreover, Feisal had been long enough m n g an
know that any Government now going to Parliament ior a renewal of these exor i an
payments would receive very short shrift His Majesty s Government M( , lowever,
come to the conclusion that the present arrangement ot subsidies was il ogica an ar
from fair, and thev favoured a plan about which I would like to have the opinion o
the Emir. It was this-that, recognising that the system of subsidies operated
effectively in the maintenance of peace and order, we should assign a speci c sum or
this purpose in the entire Arabian peninsula. It would then be possM e l' a 3 ^
subsidy to King Hussein, not of course comparable with the war subsidv, u s i
handsome, with perhaps some payment to enable him to liquidate habiliteis am s ar
afresh. Ibn Saoud, who was now also in receipt of an extravagant allowance, \ U)1 ‘ ‘
be brought down to a more reasonable level. Ihe smaller duels the tusi, t it
Imam, and others—would be on a lower scale still. By such an adjustment we ^ lou.t
not only mark the relative degree of importance and the needs of the various chiettams,
but—and 1 attached particular importance to this- we should thus be able at once to
signify to Ibn Saoud our disapproval of militant tactics and by a threatened stoppage
of all payment in the event of his attempting a descent upon the Holy Gities to
give to King Hussein and his kingdom a much better security than by anj o t le
means suggested by Feisal. ,
The latter replied that both the principle and the manner of settlement appealei
to him entirely just; but that before it could be brought into operation he feared that
at any moment the blow might fall. Nothing that 1 could say could modify the Emir s
apprehensions in this respect. He spoke of his house, his home, his w ife, his hum y
as being at the mercy of a truculent invader, and of himself as liable to be called
away any day to fight for their defence. .. , .
Though my information was necessarily inferior to that of heisal, I said that in
my mind these apprehensions were exaggerated. V\ hat the Akhwan might do on then
own account as an undisciplined body of religious fanatics, I could not pretend to say.
But if they were, as Feisal assured me, under the control of Ibn Saoud, then 1 couk
hardly believe that, while they might raid and plunder at Taif or Taraba or elsewhere
on or even inside the disputed frontier, they would really overrun the Hejaz an
assault the Holy Places. 1 had given Ibn Saoud most clearly to understand that no
such attack upon the Hejaz, proper and undisputed, could be tolerated, and that it
would be regarded as a hostile act. 1 could not bring myself to believe mat Ibn
Saoud would think it worth while to defy us. The prospect oi losing his subsidv
altogether would surely have a very moderating influence upon him.
I could not be clear whether my remarks conveyed any real consolation to the
Emir, whose inner thoughts were veiled in the traditional courtesy ol the Oriental.
But in one respect he gave me an assurance which I thought most valuable and which
i promised to bear in mind. .
Haddad Pasha An Ottoman title used after the names of certain provincial governors, high-ranking officials and military commanders. had spoken of the unusual powers of conciliation of reisal, of
which he had seen many instances in the recent war and elsewhere; whereupon the
Emir said that he was quite willing to offer his own services as mediator with Ibn
Saoud. With his father’s consent, which he had no doubt he would receive, he was
willing at any time to meet the latter in conference to discuss and to settle the frontier
question, which he did not doubt his ability to do.
Our interview then terminated. In the course of it no mention was made of
Mesopotamia or 1 rausjordania, or of any other question than those to which 1 have
referred.
January 13, 1921.