Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎53r] (105/348)

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2. To supply, encourage and warn the population by distributing information.
3. To follow and watch the movements of enemies of the State as well as the
movements of their own troops that are taking part in street fighting.
Add. 1.—When the railways are interfered with and telephonic and telegraphic
communication is cut off headquarters must have a sure means of being able to send
out its orders and its supplies. Only the aviator can fulfil this role, therefore he is
indispensable in the suppression of internal disorder.
Add. 2.—A prompt appearance of aircraft circling above centres of trouble and
towns in revolt, the dropping of leaflets announcing the imminent arrival of troops,
the show of force against arnied resistance, the menace of severe punishment in case
of outrages against public property, all contribute to demoralise the rebels and
reassure the friendly population. By this means frequently troubles of this sort have
been nipped in the bud and the hot-bed of insurrection has been isolated. False
rumours and anti-Government propaganda spread by rebel agitators, the denial of
which by posters they have prevented by force, can easily be rectified by the distribu
tion of foreign newspapers, communiques and Government explanations.
Add. 3.—In undertakings against a revolutionary city aviators are indispensable
for supplying headquarters and troops with information on the subject of the
\ measures of the rioters as well as that necessary for the control of the movements of
t the troops.
The search for artillery positions, mine-throwers, snipers on roofs, machine
guns, observation of artillery fire and of mines cannot be made in street fighting
except by means of air observation. Dealing with an army limited in its movements,
such as Germany will possess in its future, direct intervention of aeroplanes in
fighting acquires immense importance. Without bloodshed armed rioters in rebellious
towns have often been dispersed merely by the appearance of a few machine guns,
instead of by the entry of Government troops. Insurgent bands poorly organised
are easily cowed by the sight of aircraft, detachments of our own troops isolated or
cut off have often been able to obtain through aeroplanes information, orders and
instructions, as well as supplies and ammunition. Civilian aviators cannot be
employed in these tasks, amongst other reasons because in times of political stress it
is impossible to count on them with certainty. For the greatest undertaking of all
was when the German Republic, on account of the general strike in March, was
obliged to suspend its service from Berlin to Weimar. Therefore in times of trouble
the military aviator is only politically neutral and independent of every civil organis
ation, i.e., the transport workers’ Union. He offers a sure means of transport and
conveyance of information in the hands of the army. fhe services of a single
machine which in three months was able to convey about 500 despatches, representing
flights over a distance of 80^000 kilometres, shows that in this respect one can only
rely on military aviators. Certain official English organisations have often been
compelled to resort to the necessity and the legitimate employment of military aviators
in times of internal trouble. This employment has equally been recognised as
necessary by the Commander-in-chief of the Army of Occupation of the 4th Zone of
the Rhine Provinces, the Lient.-Colonel Michelot, By a list No. 314/IV Bureau of
the §th October, 1919, authority is given to the German Commander of Section 1 of
the Neutral Zone to employ a squadron of six machines in case of serious trouble. In
the same sense some representatives of the Inter-Allied Commission expressly
reserved the right at a meeting held in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at Berlin on
* the 3rd October, 1919, to create a military service for aerial communication towards
Berlin in case of strikes, etc. The urgent journey of Colonel Tidbury from Upper
Silesia to Berlin on the 20th October, 1919, had to be carried out by means of a
German military aeroplane on account of the state of unrest and the slowness of other
means of communication. Each group of aviators would only need to possess twenty
machines. The armament of machines with machine guns on fixed mountings is
expressly forbidden. Only in case of special technical duties in case of internal
trouble each group of aviators will be supplied with fifteen machine guns and a
small number of bombs.