Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎52v] (104/348)

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an effective of four general commands, fourteen infantry divisions and six cavalry
divisions. Germany, in consequence of its impoverishment and its economic
situation, which has been gravely compromised, is not in a position to support the
great expenses necessitated by the upkeep of six divisions of cavalry, and the German
Government would therefore propose in place of this three new cavalry divisions
and three new infantry units. The effectives of 8,000 officers and ot 192.000 men
would, then, be divided among four general commands, twelve infantry divisions,
three cavalry divisions and five infantry brigades. The first three units would
correspond to those set forth by the Peace Treaty. The brigades would be organised
like the divisions, but they would not have artillery commanders or parks, and would
only count two infantry regiments and two artillery groups.
On the other hand, the Government propose to allow the following further
detachments of special arms : —
For each of the four infantry divisions a battalion of heavy artillery comprising
two batteries courbe and one battery a tir rasant, further a total of eight groups of
airmen and of four railway companies. In justification of these formations which
would all be included in the effective of 200,000 men, see Annex 2. The proposed
division of effectives resulting therefrom is shown in Annex 3.
These proposals spring from the desire to procure for Germany the most
indispensable guarantee to assure her development against possible disorders,
whether internal or external, and to put her in a position to proceed unfettered to
the reconstruction of her economic life. They represent the minimum of the means
which should be at the disposal of the German Government desirous direct to aright
the efforts they are making to conform to the demands of the Peace Treaty. They
are, then, justified not only by the interesst of Germany, but also by those of the
Allied Governments.
Annex 2.
A treatise on the reasons for maintaining formations of heavy artillery gangs for
railway work and also, for the time being, of aviators.
Heavy A rtillery.
Experience has shown, chiefly during the recent battles, that one is not able to
dispense with heavy artillery even during civil wars. The rebels are considerably
superior in numbers to the Government troops, they make use of heavy guns and profit
by their war experience in building earthworks. Against this advantage the Govern
ment troops must be able to oppose combative methods of equal value or even more
powerful, which must be immediately available in order to crush the morale of its
adversaries at the very beginning. Heavy guns alone are able to accomplish this task,
a few rounds from heavy artillery can silence any resistance at the lowest price. The
troops must have these weapons at their disposal in order to use them should occasion
arise. In most cases where it is necessary to take the guns from fortresses or from
other places one is apt to miss the opportunity of using them to advantage. The
defence of frontiers relies also upon heavy artillery, because all eastern neighbours
and the Red Armies of Russia possess similar armaments.
Gangs for Railway Work.
The efforts of the revolutionary elements are that they aim at political results,
endeavouring to hinder the movements of troops in the first place by paralysing move
ments by rail. If they succeed in this a prompt concentration of troops is rendered
impossible and the army is unable to re-establish any degree of order or tranquillity
in the country. From this it is an inevitable necessity, in view of movements of
troops, to have on one’s strength railway gangs, thanks to whom a service can be
maintained and who are capable of repairing damage to the permanent way.
Flying Services.
For the time being, until the internal conditions are consolidated, small detach
ments of aeroplanes which are able to perform the following duties are proposed :
1. To ensure communications and the transport of supplies and personnel in the
event of a breakdown or stoppage of the usual methods of communication,
e.g., rail, telephone, telegraph.