Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎40v] (80/348)

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If the question were asked as to the precise degree of complicity in these horrible
atrocities that rested with the Turkish Government in Constantinople, it might be
difficult to determine it in exact terms. But the most powerful figure in Asia Minor
at this moment was Mustapha Kemal, a Turkish official, who was Governor of
Erzeroum and in practical command of the Turkish forces throughout Asia Minor. It
was inconceivable that he should not be well aware of what was going on. '1 here was
even reason to think that he had inspired or instigated it. Not merely had he been
appointed by the Government in Constantinople, but the latter were practically his
nominees. In any case, it was impossible to ncquit the Central Government of
responsibility for a state of affairs which showed that the Turk had learnt nothing from
recent history, and that he was still capable, even while the Powers were at his gates
and in possession of his Capital, of playing his old and villainous game.
In these circumstances the matter had been on more than one occasion carefully
considered by the Peace Conference. It had seemed to them to possess a double
character : firstly, its local application in Cilicia, and secondly, the steps to be taken
in Constantinople.
As regards Cilicia, the French, who alone had considerable troops in the
neighbourhood, had assumed entire responsibility for the restoration of order and the
reconstitution of their position. Large reinforcements had been sent or promised to
General Gouraud, and I believed that the recovery of Marash had either been already
accomplished or was on the verge of being achieved. The Powers had telegraphed to
Constantinople to ask their military and naval representatives to send round warships
to the Cilician coast if this was thought desirable. The French had in any case taken
steps of this nature, but the view of the Allied authorities in Constantinople had been
that the British Fleet was better employed and could exercise greater influence in the
neighbourhood of the Capital itself.
As to the proceedings to be taken in the latter, it was the unanimous view of the
Allies that*the Turkish Government could no longer be allowed to repeat their familiar
tactics ; that the day for diplomatic Notes and representations was gone; and that swift
and drastic action mus r , in cases of this sort, replace the circumlocution and circum-
ambulation of the past. Accordingly a telegram had been addressed by the Allied
Governments to their High Commissioners in Constantinople, expressing these views
and asking them what concerted action they would propose to take.
By a strange coincidence, almost simultaneously the British High Commissioner,
Admiral de Robeck, had on the 29th February addressed a telegram to the British
Government, in which, without reference to the Cilician massacres, he had expounded
at length the critical and in some respects humiliating position in which the Powers found
themselves in Constantinople, and the impending necessity for prompt and decisive action.
I read to the Ambassador the parts of the Admiral’s telegram in which he had explained
that he and his colleagues were confronted every where with evasion and procrastination,
and with a tendency to latent or open defiance. They were, in fact, in a hopelessly false
position. Moreover, the Nationalist leaders were emboldened to think that the programme
of resistance to drastic peace terms could be carried through to the end of the chapter
with ease and impunity. The High Commissioners had accordingly come to the
conclusion that preparation should be made at once for effective action to be taken
whenever Nationalist defiance passed the limits of endurance or when other developments
in the situation might make it desirable. Either of these events might happen in the
very near future. By “ effective action ’ he meant the occupation of Constantinople,
followed by such other measures as the military Authorities might consider necessarv
and feasible.
The question of the desirability of such action and of the moment for taking it
turned, however, very largely on the intentions of the P*-ace Conference. No news in
this respect had reached Constantinople except the declaration with regard to the
Capital itself. There was, however, a general impression that the terms of the proposed
Peace were likely to be drastic, and in that case they would have to be imposed hy
force of arms. If, on the other hand, which seemed unlikely, they were to be
comparatively lenient—and the nature of this leniency was described by the High
Commissioner as involving the retention of Turkish sovereignty over Smyrna and
Eastern Thrace, and of Turkish suzerainty over a portion of the region which it was
proposed to give to Armenia—then he thought that the policy of creating a “ bloc” of
moderate and well-disposed Turks round the Sultan, strong enough to fight and get the
upper hand of the extreme Nationalist Party, might be worthy of consideration.
This telegram had been followed a few days later by another, in which the High
Commissioner, who had in the meantime received our telegram and discussed the matter