Papers written by Curzon on the Near and Middle East [‎17r] (33/348)

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violent and dangerous recrudescence ot nationalist, pro-Turk, and anti-British feeling,
which is compromising the whole position in the East.
Finally, the repercussion has reached India, and there has broken out the most
serious and menacing anti-British demonstration since the Mutiny.
This situation, of which I have described both the facts and the probable
consequences, is one as to which I do not believe there is a single dissentient opinion
among those who are entitled to be regarded as experts. I have spoken to every
available authority, many of them fresh from Egypt, Mesopotamia, Syria, the Caucasus,
or Constantinople. There is not one among them who does not believe, that the
solutions being attempted in Paris will end in terrible confusion, if not in ruinous
disaster. They point out that, while the Commission is sitting, or flying, or wandering
about, the entire country, of which the fate is to be postponed for another six months,
will be in a state of ferment. Mesopotamia, which ought to be settling down under the
new regime, will be agitated. A new and formidable problem mny arise in Kurdistan.
The tension between the Zionists and the Arabs in Palestine, fostered by the extravagant
claims of the former, will become more acute. In Persia we may jeopardise the chances
of a settlement to which we have devoted a great deal of care, and which is now very
near to fruition, bv the revival of military insecurity on the north-west.
As for the Caucasus and Italy, it is difficult to speak seriously about a solution
which would be a comedy if it were not so sure to develop into a tragedy. The
Italians are the most ineffective and despised of the Western Powers in the eastern
world They are regarded with distrust and dislike by the Moslem community because
of their exploits in Tripoli and Cyrenaica. They have no conceivable interest in
the Caucasus or anywhere within a thousand miles of it. 1 heir appeal ance there, can
only lead to the immediate resumption of internecine fighting between the Armenians,
Georgians Tartars, and Russians—with difficulty restrained by the presence of the
1 ritish forces—to be followed before long either by the triumph of the Bolshevists,
already paramount at Astrakhan, or by the appearance of Denekin, preferring a certain
cpoil in the recovered trans-Caucasian provinces of Russia to more precarious military
experiments in the north. It is not in the least likely that either the Tartars or
the Russians will allow the Italians to control the oil-wells of Baku. r Ihe result can
only be a state of sanguinary anarchy in the Caucasus in which most, if not all, of the
new States will go down. Meanwhile, as soon as the Italian electoiate leahses that its
soldiers are to be employed and its finances squandered in this madcap adventure, a
sharp reaction will take place, and the mandate so hastily accepted will almost certain!}
be compulsorily and ingloriously lesigned. . p & i ■
As to the Greeks, who cannot keep order 5 miles outside the gates ot oalonica, is
it to be believed that they will be allowed contentedly to occupy and administer a
great city like Smyrna or a prov nice like Aidm ? . . _ ,
When the Turks realise that, in addition to being expelled from Europe, their
Asiatic provinces are thus to be parcelled out among foreigners whom they despise, and
that no corner of territory will be left to them which they can truly call their own, will
they not indulge in a final and frantic outbreak of racial and religious fury which may
turn Asia Minor into a vast shambles? . . . ......
That the Turks should be deprived of Constantinople is, in my opinion, inevitable
and desirable as the crowning evidence of their defeat in the war; and I believe that it
will be accepted, with whatever wrathful reluctance, by the Eastern world. But, when
it is realised that the fugitives are to be kicked from pillar to post, and that there is to
he practically no Turkish Empire and probably no Caliphate at all, 1 believe that we
shall be giving a most dangerous and most unnecessary stimulus to Moslem passions
throughout the Eastern world, and that sullen resentment may easily burst into savage
The question arises whether, if the above forecast is at all correct, it is possible,
even at the eleventh hour, to take any steps that may avert what seems likely to be a
o-reat catastrophe, by which the greater part of the Allied effort m the East wi 1 have
been thrown away.'- It is witti great diffidence that I submit the following ,
suggestions :—
1 It seems eminently desirable that, whatever the solution arrived at, whether
it be bad or crood, the Turkish question should be taken in hand by the Powers,
firmlv handled by them, and brought to a final conclusion with as little delay as
possible. Delay is the certain precursor, it has already been the main cause, of fiesh
outbreaks in the Eastern world. . . ^ , , ,, -p -
2 In the meantime, the disputes between the Trench and the British m