Miscellaneous papers on the Near and Middle East [‎32r] (63/70)

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]
PERSIA.
ARCHIVES.
[May J.j
CONFIDENTIAL
Section 1.
[ 60025 ]
No. 1.
Earl Gurzon to Mr. Balfour.
(No. 2681.)
Sir, Foreign Office, May 1, 1919.
THE enclosures contained in your despatch No. 505 of the 15th ultimo, relating to
Persia’s claims as communicated to you by the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs in
his letter of the 26th March, have been carefully examined in this Department, and in
accordance with your wishes I now submit some observations thereon.
2. The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the two documents under
examination, purports to make a statement of Persia’s “case”; he enumerates Russia’s
alleged acts of aggression, in which Great Britain is given a share ; and he finally
submits a list of demands for reparation, rectification of treaties and concessions, and
concludes by advancing certain territorial claims.
3. The Persian “ case,” as set forth in these documents, is in several respects
wholly misleading and inaccurate, many essential facts being suppressed and others
distorted, while the demands advanced are, in the main, lacking in any justification.
4. The object of the Persian spokesman appears to be to make an appeal to the
world in general, and to the United States in particular, against the policy pursued
prior to 1 907 by Russia and Great Britain separately, and, since the conclusion of the
Anglo-Russian Convention of that year, jointly by those two Powers in respect to
Persia.
5. The whole spirit of the 1907 Convention is misrepresented. This instrument
was framed with the object of putting an end to the long-standing Anglo-Russian
rivalry in Persia, which was admittedly detrimental to that country’s best interests.
The Convention did not divide the country into two “ spheres of influence ” as alleged
by the Persians, but determined certain areas within which each of the two contracting
Powers undertook, vis-d-vis the other, not to seek for concessions or to support
commercial enterprises by its own subjects. In this respect the Convention was
undoubtedly beneficial to Persia, in spite of the fact that Persian policy had been
based, until tiie period of its conclusion, on a skilful plan of playing oft* the one
Power against the other in order to obtain the maximum of advantage from both.
Unfortunately the benefits obtained by the Persians by the pursuance of this policy
w T ere not of advantage to the country as a whole, however much it may have profited
the ruling classes.
6. When the war broke out these tactics were resumed on a wider field, and
successive Persian Governments, finding that Great Britain and Russia were now firmly
united, sought to play oft* the Central Powers against the Allies, just as they are now
seeking to contrive a new combination at the Peace Conference, by a statement of their
grievances which is evidently meant to arouse American interest in their affairs and,
if possible, to provoke American intervention.
7. The statement affirms Persia’s neutrality throughout the war, and declared that
she continued “loyal and faithful to that policy to the very end.” It seems necessary
to examine this statement, and the explanations given of the causes leading up to the
“ violation of her neutrality,” for which reason “ Persia became a theatre of the war and
suffered all the consequences, horrors, and losses of a terrible conflict.”
8. The circumstances in which Russian troops were sent to various parts of
Northern Persia in 1909, in order to put an end to civil strife resulting from the conflict
between the so-called Liberal and reactionary parties in the country, need not be
recapitulated here, but it is misleading to state that these forces were sent for the
purpose of “ weakening and annihilating Persia.”
9. Without passing any judgment on the policy pursued in Persia by the late
Imperial Russian Government, it should be borne in mind that, when the war broke out
in 1914, these Russian forces were actually in occupation of certain northern parts of
the country. Persia had no effective military force at her disposal, and was quite
unable to maintain order within her own territory. In these circumstances it was
obviously impossible for her to do anything but declare her neutrality. The Persian
statesmen, however, took advantage of the situation to demand the immediate with
drawal of the Russian troops in the north, and stated that, if Persian neutrality was
[2690 a —I]