File 1166/1925 'Arabia: Nejd; negotiations with Ibn Saud regarding Iraq-Nejd question and Trans-Jordan boundary; Sir G Clayton's mission; Bahra agreement, 2nd November, 1925' [‎134v] (275/769)

Fourth Meeting.
The fourth meeting opened at 8.45 a.m. on Wednesday, the 14th
October, with the same attendance as be lore.
I enquired whether His Highness had anything further to say on
the subject which we had been discussing, and he replied that he
had nothing to add.
I said that His Highness had put forward certain historical ami
political arguments which, while they had a certain weight, did not
meet the requirements of His Majesty s (jovoi nment. 1 hose require
ments as I had already pointed out, were based entirely on practical
facts to meet which I must have something concrete. One of the
most salient of those facts, and one that weighed with the military
authorities, was that a serious attack had been made on Trans
jordan in August, 1924, which but for prompt and decisive action
bv British forces would have had very grave consequences. If an
attack on Amman itself had been allowed to materialize it would •
probably have led to a permanent rupture between His Majesty’s
Government and His Highness. In answer to facts such as this,
something more tangible than historical and political arguments
was required. That "was my position. At the same time His
Majesty’s Government were sincerely desirous of coming to an under
standing with His Highness and of cementing a lasting friendship
with him ; and my presence in his country to discuss matters with
him was evidence of their intentions. So far, to my great regret,
we had been unable to agree on an important point. In order, there
fore, that we should not waste time valuable to His Highness or
trespass longer than necessary on his generous hospitality, I thought
it would be well to leave that point for the present and proceed to a
preliminary consideration of a perhaps less contentious subject
which I was charged to discuss with His Highness. If that was
agreeable and convenient to His Highness I should like a day for
the purpose of writing up my record of what had taken place and
preparing the other questions for discussion with him on the follow
ing morning. I hoped also that further reflection might help
matters, and I was determined to spare no effort to reach an agree
ment.
Ibn Sa‘ud said he agreed to leave this subject and pass on to other
matters; the order of discussion was not important, and by a change
we might be more likely to come to an agreement. I had, however,
made certain statements to which he would like to reply. I had
asked for more definite proposals and for actual facts. He would
like to explain that, since Great Britain must realize his position
with regard to Kaf and desired an alliance and friendship, conces
sions should come first from the strong rather than the weak; in
view of the friendship of Great Britain and of the fact that I had
been sent as her representative, agreement would then be easy. An
important fact, in his opinion, was the letter they had received from
the British Agent at Bahrein, not so much on account of the letter
itself, but because it had been made known by him to all his tribes
and subjects. He had been compelled to communicate the contents
of that letter to the tribes in consequence of the raid on Trans
jordan, as he had felt it necessary to inform them of the exact limits
of his territory. He must decline to take any responsibility for the
ra’d on Trans-Jordan and he must place that responsibility on Great