File 1166/1925 'Arabia: Nejd; negotiations with Ibn Saud regarding Iraq-Nejd question and Trans-Jordan boundary; Sir G Clayton's mission; Bahra agreement, 2nd November, 1925' [‎134r] (274/769)

mentioned, surely it would not be too much to ask her to hold out
her hand to hi$ country, where no expenditure in money or lives
was concerned. The arguments which I had used were precisely
those which gave him to hope that his aspirations would be
realized. Further, the States to which he alluded had reached a
certain stage of stability and strength, whereas the country which
His Highness represented had no military strength or force which
could be in any way a menace to the interests of Great Britain.
As for the necessity of making sacrifices in the cause of friendship,
he maintained he had already done much for the cause of Great
Britain, and as regards her special position in India, the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran.
and elsewhere, he regarded that position as one of his sources of
strength. He had put a stop to all intrigues directed against Great
Britain. He had also refrained from entering into any agreements
with Arabs or with other nations and, because he believed in the
value of British friendship, he had persistently refused to contract
understandings with any other country. He realized that necessity
' might sometimes force Great Britain to seek extension, but he was
convinced that she would never do so beyond what was right and
natural. If His Majesty’s Government fully realized all these con
siderations he felt confident that they would help him and, if they
suspected his loyalty and good intentions, they would hardly have
been ready to send a special envoy to confer with him.
I told His Highness that, while I was glad to hear his remarks
and his view of the situation, I should have to think over the diver
gence between us very carefully. I pointed out that the proposals
put forward by His Majesty’s Government through my agency An office of the East India Company and, later, of the British Raj, headed by an agent. were
extremely moderate and that there was a chance for him to cement
and seal the friendship which he professed and which the British
Government was most anxious to promote. In accordance with the
measure in which the wishes of His Majesty’s Government were met
so their confidence and trust would be confirmed. I repeated that
I must consider the whole situation carefully before I came to any
decision, as I felt that any hasty action should be avoided and that
all parties must have time for reflection. I added that, on second
thoughts, I was inclined to the opinion that to proceed to the con
sideration of other questions at this stage might confuse the issue
at present before us.
Tbn Sa‘ud was of opinion that a thing begun should be finished.
He himself was a peaceful man and had explained to me his position
in all its aspects.
I stated that the question was whether or not to take action which
might be irrevocable, but that in any case I greatly appreciated the
personal attitude of His Highness and the manner in which he made
it possible to discuss all these matters with complete frankness.
Ibn Sa‘ud assured me that his attitude would always be the same
and that our personal friendship would always be maintained, to
which I made a suitable reply.
Finally His Highness expressed the hope that an agreement would
be reached for three reasons—first, because of my presence in his
country ; secondly, because the interests of Arab countries and Great
Britain were closely connected; and thirdly, because by sending a
special envoy His Majesty’s Government had proved their desire for
the friendship of his country.
The meeting ended at 11 a.m.