Letters and Papers Concerning the Trans-Persian Railway and Other Railways in Persia [‎149r] (297/442)

1955 Supply (Committee).
Foreign Office. 1956-
10 July 1912
by the High Commissioner and the In
spector-General in the Mediterranean be
fore the present occupant of that post?
These are questions which affect us so
vitally that either on this occasion or on
soine other we must have them answered.
The right hon. Gentleman will not deny
that we on this side have always trusted
him implicitly. If we ask questions it is
not with a view to hampering him, but
with a view to satisfying ourselves—as
everybody is entitled to do—-that he really
is, as we hope and believe, carrying out in
the best interests of the country the great
office with which is entrusted. We cannot
know that unless he is able to give us
satisfactory answers.
There is another reason why it is im
portant that we should know about this
withdrawal from the Mediterranean. The
withdrawal of forces from the Pacific was
justified on the ground that we had got
a treaty. I am one of those who would
see an advantage in the substitution of a
treaty with France for the present en
tente. There is an obvious reason why we
cannot know whether or not that is de
sirable at present. We are not in posses
sion of the official correspondence on the
subject. Moreover, it may not be in the
interests of France. At any rate, can the
right hon. Gentleman justify the with
drawal on the ground that we have a
treaty with France, whereby she will as
sume every obligation with regard to our
responsibilities in the Mediterranean,
in the same way that we were able to safe
guard our interests in the Pacific by an
agreement with the only Power in a position
to endanger them ? I think our interests
in the Mediterranean are of such a nature
that it would be impossible for us as a self-
respecting Power to delegate them to
another Power. If we are no longer able
to look after those interests ourselves, the
game is up, and we cease to be a first-class
PoAver. But if arrangements have been
made to have those interests safeguarded by
some other Power, perhaps the right hon.
Gentleman will be able to tell us. There
are one or two reasons which the man in
the street is bound to connect with this re
duction of force from the Mediterranean.
The first is that we are obliged to re
duce our force in the Mediterranean—
which force is there for the purpose of pro
tecting very important interests—in order
to safeguard vital interests nearer home in
the North Sea. Nobody will deny that it
is better to be absolutely secure in the
North Sea than to be moderately secure in
the North Sea and moderately secure in
the Mediterranean as well. That may be
the reason. But if that is so, before taking
that step the Government ought to be
quite sure that the country is not prepared
to make the sacrifices necessary in order
that we should be secure in both places.
They cannot say, without letting the
country know all the facts of the case,
whether, if our interests are really en
dangered, the country is not quite pre
pared to say, “In spite of the fact that we
are spending 30s. per head of the popula
tion for national defence—more than any
other country—yet we are prepared, in the
words of the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
to go on maintaining our naval supremacy
against all challengers, even if it comes to
the spending of our last halfpenny.” If
the position were put to the country they
would say, “ You have no right to take this
decision, if it is a question whether we can
afford to do it, without finding out from us,
who have to provide the money, whether we
are prepared to spend the money or not.”
That is a fundamental consideration in this
business.
There is no time to go into all the various
reasons why the maintenance of our supre
macy in the Mediterranean is of such vital
importance, but I will refer to one or two.
First of all, there is the safeguarding of
our important trade route to the East,
along which such a large quantity of our
food supplies comes. There is also the
question, which cannot be ignored, of safe
guarding the route by which reinforce
ments to our garrisons in the Mediter
ranean and Egypt must be conveyed.
That seems to me a very important con
sideration. Then there is the well-known
reason given by Admiral Mahan, pub
lished in the newspapers last year, which
I will quote :—
“ The clear reluctance to acquiesce in present naval
requirements is ominous of a day -when the Mediterra
nean may pass out of the sphere of British influence
centred round the British Isles exclusively. This will
symbolise if it does not at once accompany the passing
of the Empire ; for a hostile force in the Mediterranean
controls not only an interior line—as compared with
the Cape route—but an interior position from which it
is operative against the Atlantic as well as in the East.
It is difficult to overstate the effect of this upon the
solidity of the Empire, for the Mediterranean is one of
the great central positions of the maritime world. A
weakened Mediterranean force is the symptom that
neither as principal nor as ally may Great Britain be
able to play the part hitherto assumed by her.”
These are grave words written by a
strategist whose authority no one will dis
pute. It is because of the grave anxiety
aroused by the publication of the sup
posed intentions of the Government in
regard to the Mediterranean—whether
those accounts are accurate or false is for