Letters and Papers Concerning the Trans-Persian Railway and Other Railways in Persia [‎148r] (295/442)

1951
1952
Supply {Committee).
Foreign Office.
10 July 1912
give me credit for approaching it with
great reluctance. I do so with the full
knowledge that whatever the questions
may be, what really counts is the answer.
If I happen to ask questions to which he
would rather not reply, he undoubtedly
will find a way out of them. The question
which I desire to raise is the question of
the reduction, or the proposed reduction,
of our forces in the Mediterranean. I
trust, Sir, you will not consider that that
question is out of order, because I hope
that the right hon. Gentleman considers,
in the words of Admiral Mahon, that “ the
balance of forces influences continually
and decisively the solutions of diplomacy.”
There is no doubt, I think, that the Army
and the Navy exist for the purpose of
maintaining what is our greatest interest,
namely, peace. In order to maintain
peace, it appears to me that the right hon.
Gentleman, or whoever occupies his office,
is bound to have a predominant voice
in matters regarding the strength and
disposition of both our naval
and our military forces. On that
ground I trust I may be allowed to deal
with this question, although it may appear
that in some of its aspects it would be more
suitable for the War Office or the Admiralty
or the Imperial Defence Vote, though we
have been put off on two occasions with
regard to this matter. When it was raised
on the War Office Vote the right hon. Gen
tleman the Secretary of State said it was
more a naval question, and then again,
when it was discussed in another place, to
the best of my recollection, there was no
Noble Lord to give an adequate or satis
factory An East India Company trading post. answer. I hope that the right hon.
Gentleman, who certainly is competent to
give an answer on this important question,
will be able to vouchsafe some information.
The question of naval and military
strength, it is agreed all over the world, is
one which cannot be separated from foreign
affairs. May I recall to the right hon.
Gentleman’s recollection portion of a
speech of M. Pichon, on the 23rd of
February, 1911, when the French Chamber
was engaged in discussing whether certain
new warships should be laid down or not.
The Socialist members of that body took
occasion to suggest that before laying
down those ships efforts should be made
to arrive at an understanding with other
nations for the purpose of limiting arma
ments. M. Pichon, like every other Foreign
Minister, and like everybody else, would
be exceedingly glad, and he said so, if any
such arrangement could be reached; but
meanwhile he, like other persons, is re
sponsible for the safety of his country. In
the course of his speech he referred to the
remarks of Mr. Taft, who at the time was
engaged in endeavouring to secure a treaty
of international arbitration, and said:—
“ Above all, do not let ns forget to strengthen our
navy and our army—let us take all necessary precau
tions. There is, in truth, the guarantee of peace. That
is a truth that we cannot too often affirm. The best
guarantee of peace, so far as we are concerned, is in
the strength of our navy and the strength of our
army.”
I venture to think that that applies to every
country in the world. There are some hon.
Gentlemen who imagine that diplomacy,
by some means or other, by blarney,
bluster, or bluff, on difficult occasions can
achieve the same result. Nobody who has
had even a short experience in the diplo
matic service would think or believe that.
If the right hon. Gentleman asks to-day any
of the Ambassadors who serve under his
orders what they consider most important
for the purpose of strengthening our posi
tion in the world, they will answer—I think
one of them answered to me—“ Put your
Army and Navy into good condition, and
then we shall be able to do something.”
All that we w r ant to do is to keep what we
have got; to keep the good relations we
possess, and to improve the relations which
at the present moment are not satisfac
tory. That, 1 think, nobody will deny, is
briefly the object of our policy. There are
two things to be considered which may
be very satisfactory to those whose in
terests from time to time are opposed to
ours, or who think they are. It may be
satisfactory to them to see a reduction in
our naval forces in the Mediterranean.
They may welcome with approval anything
which has the appearance of weakening
our position in any part of the world ;
but equally those with whom we are on
friendly terms, and those with whom w*e
are accustomed to act, cannot surely help
viewing with the greatest possible concern
any action on the part of our Government
which will alter the share which they
rightly look to us to take in war, if un
fortunately war should arise, or in those
negotiations which may lead to the pre
vention of war, which is equally important.
In approaching this question of the Medi
terranean, I was very much concerned to
read articles in two journals to-day. I
am thankful that one of them, although it
does represent the views of many hon.
Members opposite, certainly cannot be
credited with representing the views of
the right hon. Gentleman the Secretary
of State for War. That journal, the