Letters and Papers Concerning the Trans-Persian Railway and Other Railways in Persia [‎145v] (290/442)

1941 Supply (Committee). HOUSE OF
COMMONS Foreign Office. 1942
[Mr. Lloyd.]
with the least possible amount of offence,
either to one Power or another. But I
must say that if the hon. Gentleman sug
gests that the policy of the Government
or of the Opposition is in any way hostile
to Germany or any other one Powej' as
such, he misreads the whole object and
intention of the entente, which I think
everyone on this side of the House cor
dially welcomes. I think there are many
hon. Members on the other side of the
House, and some newspapers, that have
lately been decrying the policy of the Triple
entente, because they say it is proceeding in
hostility to all those who are excluded from
the entente, and they oppose it partly on the
ground that they can see no reason why we
should interfere in the policy of Europe. I
believe these are their two principal
grounds of objection. I think nothing is
simpler than to show how it is that we
have been forced into this entente. I
should like to quote a famous statement
by Prince Bismarck which we might apply
ourselves in regard to foreign nations.
He wrote:—
‘•My attitude to foreign Governments springs not
from any antipathy, but frotn the good or evil they can
do to Prussia.”
I believe that in our policy with respect to
the entente we feel exactly towards Ger
many as to any other Power. I myself, in
advocating the policy of the Triple entente,
feel no antipathy to any of the other
Powers, but I do think w r e have, as a sen
sible nation, to weigh up the forces that
might be used against us among the
Powers of Europe, and to take the neces
sary precautions in that respect. As
regards those who are against the policy
of the Triple entente, I should like to state
the case as I see it. First of all, it should
be stated, I think, that it is the founda
tion of our whole foreign policy that we
have only two main considerations. One
is to secure the safety of India, and the
other is to prevent the domination of
Europe by any single Power. For the last
one hundred years our attention w r as fixed
almost entirely on the defence of India.
There was no Power that could dominate
Europe, and, on the other hand, there was
a good deal of reasonable anxiety with
regard to India. It was held that the
policy of Russia at one time was a danger
to India. There was a consolidation of
Russian interests in Central Asia and
Tibet. I think these alone were sufficient
reasons to make us observe a cautious
policy with regard to the defence of India.
After that there came an entirely dif
ferent policy. We had the Russo-Japanese
War, and temporarily the power of Russia
was arrested. The ardour of those who-
took an interest in foreign affairs, and
especially Eastern affairs, was momen
tarily damped down, and but for the rising
of another Power in Europe we should have
seen the decline of the Russian Power co
incide almost exactly with the rise of Ger
many as a great dominant military Power
in Europe. I ask is it possible for a nation
like ours, with immense Imperial responsi
bilities over the whole world, to ignore the
forces that might come against iU We had
to take precautions with regard to the
central position in Europe. There are
those on the other side of the House who-
never saw any danger in the accumulation
in the hands of one Power of immense in
fluence and a large army. The question
was whether Germany was a dominant
Power in Europe, and whether she was a
possible great danger to this country. I
think if we had ignored the position of
Germany after the Japanese War, we
should have been ignoring a very great
danger. I wish to chronicle the events-
which lead me to believe this. We have to*
recognise that certain things took place in
the last ten years. First of all, there was
the pressure asserted by Germany on the
independence of Holland, -which was severe
while it lasted. That was a militant policy.
Then there was the pressure in 1905, which
resulted in the fall of M. Delcasse. That
was a policy which affected the liberties of
other Powers. Then there was the pres
sure of Russia in Bosnia and Hertzegovina
—a pressure which affected the whole
weight and influence of the balance of
power in Europe. There was the pressure
of Germany on France more recently, and
not entirely on France alone, in connection
with the Agadir incident. I believe that if
we were to ignore all these factors in our
policy, we should be little short of criminal
in regard to the interests of our nation
ality. To have ignored in this country
these factors which so vitally affect the
balance of power in Europe would not only
have been foolish, but would have been
to draw ourselves the design of our own
sarcophagus. I chronicle these events
merely to show that in the whole of our
relations with European Powers, it was
natural that this country should now do as
she had done previous to a hundred years
ago, namely, group ourselves from the de
fensive point of view with other Powers.
There is no doubt that the position in
Europe is still very clouded. We have-