Letters and Papers Concerning the Trans-Persian Railway and Other Railways in Persia [‎142v] (284/442)

1929
Supply (Committee)
Foreign Office 1930
HOUSE OF COMMONS
[Earl of Ronaldshay.]
recall what that policy has been. From
the beginning of 1909 until the autumn of
1910 our policy was governed by a declara
tion by the right hon. Gentleman in favour
of complete non-intervention in the affairs
of Persia. Perhaps I may be permitted
to read the right hon. Gentleman’s words,
because they are of very great import
ance. He said:—
“ After full consideration of all the circumstances
His Majesty’s Government are disposed to think that
the best course to adopt would be for Great Britain and
Russia to stand entirely aloof from the internal affairs
of Persia, allowing the existing chaos to remain until
whatever element is strongest gains the day. During
this interval they would be prepared to face the danger
which might be involved to British commercial
interests.”
That was a carefully considered policy
announced on the part of the Government
of this country. It involved complete non
intervention in Persia, even though that
non-intervention might subject British
commercial interests to considerable
danger. That policy held the field until
the autumn of 1910, when it underwent a
dramatic change. The right hon. Gentle
man then presented an ultimatum to the
Persian Government informing them that
unless the state of disorder in some parts
of the country was largely improved during
the next three months, he would feel him
self obliged to step in to undertake the task
of protecting British interests. That was a
complete change of policy which one would
have welcomed if the right hon. Gentle
man had been in a position to carry it
out. But what happened? The state of
disorder Mas continued. Three months
elapsed, and no improvement was shown
in the situation, but the brave words of
the ultimatum of the previous autumn
were allowed to fall into the limbo of dead
and forgotten things. No action was
taken. Last summer certain events con
nected with the names of Major Stokes
and Mr. Shuster occurred. Both of these
gentlemen were invited by the Persian
Government to take service under it.
Both were desirous of accepting the invita
tion which had been extended to them ; but
both were informed that they would not
be permitted to do so, because, being
British subjects, it would be contrary to
the pledge contained in the Anglo-Russian
Agreement if they took service in that por
tion of Persia which was within Russia’s
sphere of influence. I do not quarrel with
the decision of the right hon. Gentleman
on that point. It may have been entirely
justified. But here, again, I complain that
the right hon. Gentleman showed con
siderable indecision. He first gave Major
Stokes to understand that he would be
entitled and permitted to accept an ap
pointment under the Persian Government
if he first resigned his commission in the
British Army. But, having persuaded him
to send in his resignation, he proceeded to
tell him that that resignation could not be
accepted. That seemed to be treating
Major Stokes with scant courtesy.
In the meantime the situation continued
in Persia as bad as ever, and in the early
autumn of last year the right hon. Gentle
man asked for troops from India in order
to protect the British Consular posts at
Shiraz, Kerman, and Ispahan. The in
structions given to those additional troops
limited their functions very strictly to the
protection of British life and British pro
perty. They were instructed to take no
part in escorting caravans and in safe
guarding trade routes, and their presence,
therefore, gave them very little influence
indeed on the general situation. How bad
that situation continued to be is sufficiently
proved by the attack made upon a British
Consul—Mr. Smart—in December last, in
which Mr. Smart was wounded and
members of his escorts were either killed
or wounded. What was the policy of the
right hon. Gentleman arising out of that
serious state of things in December last?
The published correspondence is singularly
silent upon that point. It is quite true
that rumour was not at all silent; but I do
not wish to deal with the rumours pre
valent not long ago as to certain measures
said to be contemplated by the right hon.
Gentleman. I will confine myself to the
information supplied in the published
correspondence. That information is that
in January last, the Indian Government
submitted certain proposals to the right
hon. Gentleman for dealing with the situa
tion. Those proposals involved three im
portant points. The first was as to enter
ing into negotiation with the tribes in
South Persia with a view of raising levies
in those tribes with the assistance of
British officers. The second was the
deposition of a notorious individual, the
Khan of Borasjun; and the third was a
strict blockade of the whole Persian
littoral with a view to preventing the influx
of arms and ammunition into that country.
These are concrete practical proposals;
but I was astonished, after a careful
persual of the Blue Book, not to find anv
answer from the right hon. Gentleman to
the Indian Government on them. The
only reference was a somewhat cryptic
utterance of the right hon. Gentleman in