Letters and Papers Concerning the Trans-Persian Railway and Other Railways in Persia [‎142r] (283/442)

1927 Supply (Committee). 10 July 1912 Foreign Office. 1928
down in the terms of the Convention itself
that certain articles of it should not come
into operation until the signature of the
Ameer of Afghanistan was appended to
them. Five years have passed, and the
signature of that potentate has not been
appended yet. I think that is an indica
tion that our policy in that part of the
world has not been viewed altogether with
satisfaction by the Ameer of Afghanistan,
but, on the contrary, by no small measure
of suspicion.
That being so, what have we to com
plain of with regard to the action of
Russia during recent times in Persia 1 ? I
am bound to say a study of the proceedings
of Russia in Persia recently has created
the impression in my mind that she is by
no means so desirous of seeing the survival
of an independent Persia as we ourselves.
The return of the ex-Shah of Persia was
a source of great embarrassment to the
Persian Government. The Russian Gov
ernment had pledged itself to take “ade
quate measures ”—I think those were the
exact words of the Protocol of 1909—to
prevent the ex-Shah from indulging in an
agitation against the Persian Govern
ment. Yet the ex-Shah returned to Persia
from Russia, going from the Caspian Sea,
which is practically a Russian sea, in a
Russian vessel. It is quite true the cen
tral Government at St. Petersburg dis
claimed all knowledge of the movements
of that gentleman, and that disclaimer is,
of course, unhesitatingly accepted by us;
but the House must remember that Rus
sian agents and Russian officials have far
greater independence and freedom than
have British officials, and it does seem
to me passing strange the ex-Shah and
his supporters should have been able to
charter a Russian ship and to embark
upon that ship with very large stores of
arms and ammunition, and to have pro
ceeded in a Russian ship from a Russian
port to Persia. All I can say is that when
I myself have travelled in Russian Central
Asia I have had to go through the strictest
formalities before it was possible for me
to obtain a permit even to carry with me
a single rifle and a box of ammunition,
and when I have obtained such a permit
I have had to submit it to the inspection
of innumerable Russian officials. Those of
us who have studied closely the history
of the advance of Russia across Central
Asia cannot, of course, help being
aware that unauthorised acts of local
Russian officials have not infrequently
been taken advantage of in the past.
When we bear in mind that the return of
the ex-Shah welcomed with acclamation
by a large section of the Russian Press, we
must be forgiven if we see in the situation
in North Persia during last autumn a strik
ing and disconcerting reproduction of the
situation which existed in Merv, Khiva,
and other parts of Central Asia on the eve
of their absorption by Russia during the
latter part of last century. I think the
right hon. Gentleman himself was troubled
with serious apprehensions as to what the
intentions of the Russian Government
were, for, on 2nd December of last year,
he telegraphed to the British Ambassador
in St. Petersburg in the following words :—
“ I feel strongly that Teheran should not he occupied
hy the Russians except in last resort, and that new and
more extensive demands should not be put forward by
them. The danger which I anticipate is that they may
make new demands which Reing neither inevitable nor
consistent with the Anglo-Russian agreement I should
be unable to defend.”
And speaking to the Russian Ambassador
(Count Beckendorff) on the same day he
used these words;—
“ At present we are passing through a very delicate
and difficult time, and I am afraid that the Government
in St. Petersburg do not realise what great issues are at
stake and what great care is needed to prevent our
drifting apart.”
Happily the White Paper published last
week seems to show that the crisis, so far
as Russia is concerned, has, for the time
being, passed, and it is with the very
greatest satisfaction that I have observed
that since the return of M. Sazonoff to the
active control of the Russian Foreign
Office Russian policy in that part of the
world seems to have undergone consider
able modification. It is quite true that
they are still showing a good deal of reluct
ance in withdrawing their troops from the
northern part of Persia. I gather that
there were at least 12,000 Russian troops
there as lately as January last, but I hope
that when the right hon. Gentleman comes
to sum up the Debate this evening he will
be in a position to give us reassuring in
formation on that point. I pass from the
danger of Russian occupation in North
Persia, and I would like to ask the right
hon. Gentleman what is his policy regard
ing Persia itself at the present time 1 ? I
say “at the present time” because the
course of British policy during recent times
has been somewhat devious. I do not
mean to say that the course pursued by
the right hon. Gentleman has been cha
racterised by moral obliquity, but the path
pursued by him does not appear by me to
have been carefully thought out or pre
determined. On the contrary, it has been
subject to periodic oscillations. Let me