Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎130r] (259/290)

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cases, but he was very anxious to avoid what would be tantamount
to an invitation to the Bolsheviks to land at Enzeli. Why should
the War Office not wait until it was really necessary to move? A
premature withdrawal might have the effect of bringing down the
whole castle about our ears.
Mr. Montagu suggested that the best solution would be for
instructions to be sent to the General Officer Commanding on the
lines of those recently despatched by Cabinet decision in the
analogous case of Batoum. The (ifficer Commanding at Batoum had
been told that he must at all costs avoid any possibility of a military
disaster, but that, at the same time, it was desirable for political
reasons that he should retain his position as long as he possibly could.
General Radcliffe stated that this was putting an unfair
responsibility on the local commander who would naturally try to
hang on as long as he could — all honour to him for doing so—but we
who have a wider view of the whole situation should take the
responsibility of ordering him away.
Mr. Montagu said that he did not quite understand theargumen*
that the Enzeli force must be withdrawn to meet Treasury objections.
There did not seem to be any difference from a Treasury point of
view whether the small force concerned were at Enzeli or at Ka«vin.
He drew attention to the three proposals made by the Persian Prime
Minister, and reported by Sir Percy Cox in his telegram of the 14th
May, and suggested that they should be discussed.
The Chairman concurred. He had of course no wish to interfere
in purely military matters, and it was obviously undesirable that we
should risk a military disaster, but he thought that the decision should
be left to the inctn on the spot, as in the case of Batoum. The three
proposals of the Persian Prime Minister were based on the hypothesis
that His Majesty’s Government were still not prepared in any circum
stances to send any reinforcements of British troops to Persia. He
supposed this hypothesis was correct. The first proposal was that
the garrison of gendarmes now at Ispahan should be withdrawn and
re laced by a detachment of South Persia rifles from Kerman, or
failing that by a Bakhtiari garrison.
General Radcliffe said that the War Office had no opinion to
offer on this proposal.
Mr. Oliphant said that the position at Kerman was quite quiet,
and that no news had been received of any local feeling there in
favour of the Bolsheviks.
The Chairman saw no objection to the first proposal. The
second proposal was that the gendarmes thus released, with the
addition of the Central Brigade and such other units as could be
spared from the capital, to a total number of 3,000, should be sent
urgently to Tabriz. This was a matter for Persia to decide. While
he did not wish to press strongly for the retention of the two
platoons at Tabriz, he thought it possible that the two questions
might be combined. Might we not say to the Persian Govern
ment that our detachment there was a very small one and
could obviously not remain unsupported? We might accordingly
suggest that the Prime Minister’s second proposal should be carried
into effect immediately, and the question of withdrawing the two
platoons might be deferred until the arrival of the 3,0( 0 men at
Tabriz. At the same time, he was rather doubtful whether these
3,000 men would ever materialise.
Mr. Montagu pointed out that the second proposal was con
ditional on the third, which was that to make up for the suggested
depletion at the Centre, Norperforce, whether it remained distributed
between Kasvin and Enzeli, or whether it were concentrated at
Kasvin, should be substantially reinforced from Bagdad sufficiently