Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎117r] (233/290)

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Following round the shores of the Caspian we now came to
our old friend Enzeh, and the question of the command of the
Caspian was once more raised. He had always agreed in theorv
that it was desirable for the command of the Caspian to remain in
anti-Bolshevik hands, and had recommended the handing over ol
the fleet to Denikin if it were not possible^ for us to retain it
ourselves. Lord Beatty had suggested m Paris that a naval force
of 1,200 men should be despatched to reassume the command of the
Caspian. This proposal had been rejected owing to the impossibility
of our remaining in military occupation of Baku — the essential
stipulation from the Admiralty point of view. 1 he Chief of the
Imperial General Staff had stated that it would be impossible for us
to retain Baku with less than three divisions. Politic d considera
tions had perforce given way to naval and military objections. He
regretted the decision, which appeared to him to be wrong, though
he could not of course meet the pui ely naval and military arguments.
The only occasion on which the proposal had been definitely revived
was when Colonel Stokes reverted to it on his arrival in England.
Colonel Stokes had expressed the opinion that not even one division
j| would be necessary to guard the line of communications from Batoum
to Baku. It would only be necessary for the international garrison
at Batoum to be retained as a moral pivot. No local elements would
} be likely to cut the railway or to threaten the line of communications,
which would be safe enough for all practical purposes. He had sent
Colonel Stokes to interview the Admiralty and War Office, but he
understood that his arguments had not carried conviction. He
would personally be glad if the idea of the Caspian experiment could
be revived in some form or other. At Enzeli itself we had
Norperforce, who had been instructed to bluff as long as they could.
He presumed that there was no intention of modifying these
instructions.
The only remaining theatre to be discussed was the Province of
F><rs and the districts between Shiraz and the Persian Gulf The historical term used to describe the body of water between the Arabian Peninsula and Iran. . He
confessed that he was very much puzzled at the recent telegrams on
the situation m Ears. What were the facts ? For a year and a half we
had been making every effort to get rid of these troops. I hey had
penetrated into the district on the responsibility of the Government
of India and had built a railway from Bushire to Borazjum and
proposed to extend it to Daliki. The factors which had justified
this extension of our responsibilities had long since disappeared.
Wassmussand the elusive Saulat had vanished. Only two unimpor
tant rebellious khans were left. Now, when the evacuation had been
approved for a considerable time, Sir Percy Cox suddenly demanded
the retention of the force merely for the capture of these two small
agents.
Farman Farma had even suggested tliat the evacuation would
T result in the enforced retirement from Shiraz of the British forces,
while the Commandant of the South Persian Rifles had recommended
that the British ladies in Shiraz should be sent away to safety with
the Indian troops as they passed through. If it were not for the
' fact that Sir Percy Cox appeared to attach some importance to these
; suggestions, though he did not altogether agree with them, he
would be inclined to say that everyone on the spot had lost his head.
- He felt sure that the Cabinet would decline to sanction the retention
of the forces in Fars on the grounds now put forward, and he
thought that they would be right in doing so.
He would also ask the advice of the Conference on the situation
as a whole. His own inclination was to say to the Persian Govern
ment that, while it was cpiite true that we were bound by our
agreement with them to do our utmost to assist them, we could not
accept their contention that we had guaranteed their protection.
Geographical and political considerations must necessarily limit the
extent to which we could assist them, and within these limits we
were doing all we could. Where would they have been had no