Papers of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs [‎110r] (219/290)

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Urumia by arrangement with the Persian Government. This
suggestion appeared to contemplate a slight extension of the
Persian frontier which was, in his opinion, worth considering and
which might fit in with the desire of His Majesty’s Government tn
meet the Persian aspirations for territorial expansion as far as
possible. Whether it would be equally conducive to the future
security of the Assyrian people he could not say.
The only alternative that had been put forward for the
repatriation of the Turkish Assyrians was that they should he
settled in an enclave in the neighbourhood of Koehannes and
Julamerk.
The War Office appeared also to favour Colonel Wilson’s
suggestions, though the General Officer Commanding, Mesopotamia,
pointed out that the inclusion of Jezirat-ibn-Omar in the British
sphere of influence would necessitate the maintenance and support
of a garrison at a considerable distance from Mosul, which would
present certain difficulties. It was of course impossible to consider
the future of Kurdistan without reference to the degree of connection
which the Turks would be able to retain with the Kurdish areas.
The India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. feared that the complete expulsion of the Turks
from Kurdistan was no longer a practicable proposition, but they did
not think that the retention of Turkish authority uncontrolled in
these areas would necessarily be destructive of the scheme proposed
by them, provided that British influence was sufficiently strongly
maintained in the suggested Kurdish States of Southern Kurdistan
and the Bohtan.
He would ask the Conference to assist him in arriving at a
proposal to put before the Peace Conference.
There were two rather disturbing factors which must not be lost
sight of. The. first was that Colonel \\ ilson had apparently abandoned
his original proposal for a fringe of autonomous Kurdish States
round the northern borders of Mesopotamia ; and the second was
that as a result of persistent and unscrupulous propaganda on the
part of the Turks, the Kurds themselves now appeared to desire to
retain their connection with the Ottoman Empire. If this were
really the case we could no longer regard them, as we had done
hitherto, as a potentially independent State, anxious to free itself
from Turkish dominion and eager to accept our co-operation to attain
this freedom.
There were two main questions on which he would ask the
Con f V-rence to assist him in arriving at a conclusion. Firstly, were
we or were we not to accept the recommendation of Colonel Wilson,
supported as it was by the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. and the War Office, that we
should accept the responsibility for Southern Kurdistan, and, if so,
should it be incorporated in Mesopotamia or treated differently, as
suggested by the India Office The department of the British Government to which the Government of India reported between 1858 and 1947. The successor to the Court of Directors. ?
Secondly, how were we to fit in our ideas about the future of
Kurdistan with those of the French Government ?
With regard to the first of these questions, he wished to say
that he personally remained anxious for us to curtail our responsi
bilities as far as we possibly could. He could not help being nervous
about the future, and his anxiety was shared by the Cabinet. It
must be remembered that the Cabinet demanded very excellent
reasons in support of any suggestion for the increase of British
military and political commitments. Their attitude might be
described as frankly hostile to any such extension. In reply to the •
arguments that Southern Kurdistan was a productive area and had
great potentialities in mineral wealth nnd tobacco, they not un
naturally replied that these advantages must be weighed against the
risk to British lives which appeared to be inseparable from our
attempts to obtain control of Kurdish areas.
His own view was that it would be preferable to leave Kurdistan
altogether alone. He did not recommend either that it should be
incorporated in the British sphere or that we should establish a kind